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1. INTRODUCTION: SEARCHING FOR THE
ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

Corporate law in Korea has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent years. In an effort to revamp Korean corporations,
the Korean government made sweeping reforms to Korea's
Commercial Code (sang-bup)three times in the past four yearsin 1995, 1998, and 1999.' These newly amended provisions have
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1 See Commercial Code, Law No. 1000 of 1962 (as amended Law No. 5053
of 1995, Law No. 5591 of 1998 and Law No. 6086 of 2000) ("KCC"). The corporate law section of Korea's Commercial Code can be found between Articles
169 and 637. In this Article, the changes will be referred to as"1995 KCC,"
"1998 KCC," and "1999 KCC" respectively, and simply "KCC" if no changes
were made in 1995, 1998, or 1999. For a critical view on how the KCC and the
Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") should be amended to harmonize each other,
see Ki-won Choi, IMF ui geuk-bok-eul wui-han sang-bup-gae-jung bang-hyang ()
[How the Korean Commercial Code Should Be Amended to Overcome the IMF
Situation ()], L. TIMES (Seoul), Apr. 13, 1998, at 14.
Other major laws that can apply to corporations include the Civil Code,
the SEA, the Securities Investment Trust Business Act, the Securities Investment Company Act, the Foreign Exchange Trade Act, the Bankruptcy Act,
and the Composition Act. See Securities Investment Company Act, Law No.
5557 of 1998 (as amended Law No. 6174 of 2000); Foreign Exchange Trade
Act, Law No. 4447 of 1991 (as amended Law No. 5550 of 1998); Securities Investment Trust Business Act, Law No. 2129 of 1969 (as amended Law No.
6179 of 2000); Bankruptcy Act, Law No. 998 of 1962 (as amended Law No.
61115519 of 2000); Composition Act, Law No. 997 of 1962 (as amended Law
No. 6110 of 2000); SEA, Law No. 972 of 1962 (as amended Law No. 6176 of
2000); and Civil Code, Law No. 471 of 1958 (as amended Law No. 5454 of
1997).
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set in motion unprecedented changes for the Korean corporate
environment. Korean management is finally beginning to be
monitored and challenged in a more meaningful manner, while at
the same time, directors and auditors have gained both renewed
authority and responsibilities. Shareholder rights have been
strengthened to levels previously unimaginable by Korean standards. 2 The number of mergers and acquisitions has risen noticeably, and unfriendly corporate takeovers have even been attempted? Although still far from international standards, these
new corporate regulations not only can assist other industrializing

countries that are contemplating similar regulatory changes, but
they can also contribute to the debate surrounding the potential
for global convergence in corporate governance.4
More specifically, the 1995 amendments ("1995 KCC")
marked only the second time that Korea amended its corporate

law section of the KCC since the KCC's initial enactment in

1962. 5 The 1995 amendments attempted to address a broad range
2

See infra Section 3.3.

3 See KOREA FAIR TRADE COMM'N, TONG-GYE-YON-BO [ANNUAL
STATISTICS], Mar. 26, 1999 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.ftc.go.kr>.

See infra Section 4.2 for examples of recent unfriendly takeover attempts. The
number of mergers filed with the Korea Fair Trade Commission that involved
companies with total assets or sales greater than 100 billion won (U.S. $83 million) were as follows:

Merger
Filings

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

62

55

48

48

63

75

151

45

' Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are some other countries that are pursuing reform in their corporate governance regulations. See ANDREW STONE
ET AL., THE BusINESS ENVIRONMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
STRENGTHENING INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PERFORMANCE, 6-7

(1998) (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/
privatesector/cg/docs/busenvp8.pdf> (one of five papers prepared by World
Bank staff for their 1998 annual meeting); cf John C. Coffee, Jr., The Futureas
History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); Roberta Romano,A Cautionary
Note on DrawingLessons from Comparative CorporateLaw, 102 YALE L.J. 2021
(1993).
' But see Ki-won Choi, Sang-bup-gae-jung-an-ui moon-jae.jum [The Problems
with the Proposalto Amend the Commercial Code], L. TIMES (Seoul), June 13,
1994, at 14 (suggesting that the Commercial Code was being revised too frequently). The fast time the corporate law section of the KCC was substantively amended occurred in 1984. See Law No. 3724 of 1984. See generally Gil-
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of issues including shareholder rights, the regulation of mergers
and acquisitions, and the role of directors and auditors. Many of
these changes had been long advocated, but were often delayed
under the pretext that corporations were not ready.6 Before the
impact of the 1995 KCC could fully be measured, however, Korea's economy plunged into one of the worst recessions in its history, falling victim to the financial contagion that swept across

most of Asia in 1997.
The 1997 financial crisis exposed a wide range of structural

weaknesses in Korea's economy. International organizations such
as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the Interna-

tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World
Bank"), in particular, criticized Korea's corporate sector and
blamed ineffective corporate regulation as a major cause of the

crisis.8 In addition to corporate sector reforms, such as corporate

jun Park, Gae-jung-sang-bup-hae-sul [Explanation of the Amended Commercial

Code], Jeung-gwon, Mar. 1984, at 37 (providing background on the 1984
amendments to the KCC).
6 See Hee-chul Chung, Sang-bup-gae-jung-si-an-ui moon-jae-jum [Problems
with the ProposedAmendments to the Commercial Code], 23 BUP-HAK [hereinafter SEOUL L.J.] 1 (1982) [hereinafter Hee-chul Chung, Problems]; Hee-chul
Chung, Sang-bup-gae-jung-an-ui gae-yo-wa moon-jae-jum [Summary of,and Problems with, the ProposedAmendments to the Commercial Code] 24 SEOUL LJ.24

(1982) [hereinafter Hee-chul Chung, Summary]; Ju-chan Sonn, Han-gook-sangbup-gae.jung-ui hwoe-go [Reflections on Amendments to Korea's Commercial
Code], 10 SANG-SA-BuP-YON-GOO [hereinafter COM. L. REV.] 25 (1992) [hereinafter Ju-chan Sonn, Reflections]; Ju-chan Sonn, Sang-bup-gae-jung-an-ui moonjae-jum' ui moon-jae-jum [The Problems with 'The Problers with the Proposed
Amendments to the Commercial Code'], L.TIMES (Seoul), June 23, 1994, at 15.
' See generally TOMAS J.T. BALIlRO & ANGEL UBIDE, THE KOREAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997- A STRATEGY OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM

(International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/99/28, 1999) (providing a comprehensive view on the origns of the crisis and how it affected Korea); Nouriel Roubini, What CausedAsia's Economic and Currency Crisis and Its
Global Contagion? (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.stern.nyu.edu
/ - nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html> (displaying links and articles on
causes of Asian financial crisis).
8 See BALIuo & UBIDE, supra note 7, at 7 ("[L]ack of transparency in fi-

nancial and corporate sectors, weak governance, and poor regulatory systems

hampered the efficient functioning of markets in disciplining the Korean economy."). In its "Letter of Development Policy" concerning the Second Structural Adjustment Loan from the World Bank, the Korean government admitted that "[t]o restore, and sustain, financial viability and competitiveness,
Korean firms need both financial and real restructuring. The latter requires
improvements in the governance of firms and increased exposure to competitive pressures." Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee, Minister of Finance and Economy,
to James D. Wolfensohn, President, International Bank for Reconstruction and
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financial restructuring and corporate governance, the World Bank
and IMF also cited structural problems related to macroeconomic
reforms, financial sector reforms, and labor reforms.9 In return
for receiving their financial assistance, Korea enacted another
round of extensive amendments to its corporate laws on December 28, 1998 ("1998 KCC"). While the 1998 KCC arose out of
unfortunate circumstances, the financial crisis provided the impetus to further overhaul the KCC and implement reforms that remained unfinished after the 1995 amendments. Finally, on December 31, 1999, several additional amendments were enacted
("1999 KCC"). Although not as extensive, the 1999 KCC in particular included new provisions governing stock options and audit
committees.
This background provides an appropriate juncture at which to
assess the impact and potential of the 1995, 1998, and 1999
amendments to the KCC. This Article will begin with a discussion of the major problems that previously existed in corporate
regulation. It will seek to show that these shortcomings not only
left Korean corporations uncompetitive, but also vulnerable to
external shocks. Next, the Article will review, in depth, the major amendments that were recently made to the KCC." The upDevelopment, para. 7 (Sept. 24, 1998), <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
extdr/offrep/eap/krsalii/ldp.htmIl > [hereinafter Letterfrom Kyu-Sung Lee].

" See

BALIlO & UBIDE,

supra note 7; Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee, supra

note 8.
10 See Letter from Kyu-Sung Lee, supra note 8; Letter from Kyung-Shik
Lee, Governor, Bank of Korea, and Chang-Yeul Lim, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Finance and Economy, to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund (Feb. 7, 1998) (visited Feb. 21, 2000)
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/020798.htm>; World Bank, Korea
Second StructuralAdjustment Loan CorporateSector Reform Matrix, Part B: Corporate Governance, Competition Policies,and Reform and Privatization of StateOwned Enterprises (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
extdr/offrep/eap/krsalii/matcorps.html>; see also Steven Mufson, Rebuilding
South Korea's House of Cards; Conglomerates Totter Under Costs, Corruption,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1997, at Al; Alan Murray,Asia's Turmoil Accents Wall
Street's Strengths,ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1997, at 6.
" The KCC provides for four types of companies: hap-ja-hwoe.sa (limited
partnerships), hap-myung-hwoe-sa (general partnerships), yoo-han-hwoe-sa (limited liability companies), andjoo-shik-hwoe-sa (stock corp orations). See KCC
art. 170. This Article will focus on the changes to stock corporations, which
account for more than 92% of all companies in Korea. See CHUL-SONG LEE,
SANG-BUP-GANG-UI [LECTURES ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE] 251 (1997). See
KCC articles 288 to 542 for the provisions in the KCC that primarily govern
stock corporations.
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shot of these new laws will then be examined through several recent case studies. Lastly, some of the major unresolved issues will
be explored.
Overall, this Article will conclude that the recent changes to
the KCC are reshaping the Korean corporate environment in an
unprecedented fashion. For the first time, firms must establish
more effective checks and balances, and become more transparent
and accountable. While some reforms still languish, these changes
have set into motion a reorientation of the governance structure
of Korean corporations. The recent measures, as a whole, will
help enhance the competitiveness of corporate Korea and allow it
to become a more serious contender in the international marketplace.
2. TH1- SHORTCOMINGS OF CORPORATE KOREA

Not many countries can claim the type of post-war economic
success that Korea has achieved. By the end of 1996, Korea became the eleventh largest economy, with a per capita income of
over U.S. $10,000 in the span of three decades. When the 1997
financial crisis hit, however, the economy and corporate Korea
alike collapsed, unable to withstand the shocks of the crisis. Korean corporations, therefore, stand at a critical crossroad because
they must find a way to resolve the inherent weaknesses that
were exposed during the crisis.
Most of the faults in Korean corporations can be traced to the
failure of the corporate regulatory framework. In essence, the
management structure established to oversee business firms did
not function as expected. 2 Corporate actors, such as shareholders, the board of directors, representative directors, and auditors,
2 in addition to internal corporate governance, Korean companies also

suffered from weak external governance. An active mergers and acquisitions
market did not exist, bankruptcies were difficult to pursue, external accounting
oversight was rare, and banks failed to properly control lending practices. See

Seung-min Yoo, Dae-gi-up gyung.young-goo-jo-ui moon-jae-jum-gwa gae-sun-bangan [Problems of, and a Proposal to Improve, the Management Structure of Large
Corporations],36 SANG-JANG-HYUP 11, 18 (1997) (discussing the lack of monitoring by creditors). See generally Michael Schuman, Piling On: For Korea's
Banks, Hanbo Is Merely the Latest Shock, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1997, at 1

[hereinafter Schuman, Piling On]; South Korean Bankruptcy: Death, Where Is
Thy Sting?, ECONOMIST, July 17, 1999, at 61 (discussing South Korea's weak
bankruptcy laws).
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did not fulfill their respective statutory duties.13 One expert de-

scribes the anomalous situation whereby Korean boards would
monitor themselves as being functionally in between the dualboard system or two-tier system of Germany, and the singleboard or one-tier system of the United States. 4 Shareholders,
whether they were individual or institutional investors, did not
monitor corporate affairs. Directors and auditors, in turn, had
little incentive to act as responsible fiduciaries on behalf of the interests of all shareholders.
Over time, an ineffective system of corporate governance
emerged that was saddled with opaque business practices and an
overall lack of checks and balances." Under this lax management
structure, principal shareholders have dominated the affairs of the
corporation, serving as both chief owner and manager. Eventually, this unchallenged rule by corporate chieftains created enormous agency costs and left Korean corporations structurally vulnerable and uncompetitive.

13 The board of directors system was adopted from the Japanese system,
which, in turn, was based on the U.S. system. See Dong-yoon Chung, Sang-bup
sa-ship-oh-nyun: ge hwoe-go wa jun-mang [45 Years of the Korean Commercial
Code: Its Past and Future], in HAN-GOOK BUP-HAK UI HWOE-GO WA JUNMANG [THE PAST AND FUTURE OF KoREAN LAW] 343, 356 (1991); see also
Thomas L. Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions: Concerning Corporations,2 AM. J. COMp. L. 12, 12, 15-16 (1953) ("On a
Commercial Code of continental origin, there have been forcibly grafted certain limbs of alien, Anglo-American origin."); Lester N. Salwin, The New
Commercial Code of Japan: Symbol of Gradual Progress Toward Democratic
Goals, 50 GEO. L.J. 478, 504 (1962) (detailing the duties of board officers under
the new commercial code).
"4See Chan-hyung Chung, Gi-up-gyung-young-ui too-myung-sung-jae-go-reul
wui-han joo-Shik-hwoe-sa-uiji-bae-goo-jo-ui ae-sun I) [Improving CorporateGovernance ofStock Corporationsto Enhace Transparency of CorporateManagement
(I)], L. TIMEs (Seoul), May 7, 1998, at 14.
15 See Dae-hong Chang, Joo-joo-joong-shi gyong-young-gwa gi-up.ji.bae-goo.jo
gae-sun [Management that Paces Importance on Shareholder and Improving Corporate Governance], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 36 (1999); Soo-geun Oh, Bi-ji.bae.joojoo-ui gwon-li-bo-ho-wa gyung-yong-too-myung-sung-ui jae-go [Protectingthe Rights
ofNonprincipalShareholdersand EnhancingManagerialTransparency], 37 SANG-

JANG-HYUP 69, 73-81 (1998).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss2/2

2000]

2.1.

KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODEAMENDMENTS

279

DominantPrincipalShareholdersand Ineffective Boards of
Directors,RepresentativeDirectors,andAuditors

For most publicly held companies in Korea, principal shareholders unilaterally dictated corporate policy. 6 These principal
shareholders dominated corporate affairs without any checks or
balances in place regarding their decisions, unaccountable to anyone but themselves." In essence, they naturally placed their interests above the interests of the other shareholders because no
pressure existed to act otherwise, creating an enormous agency
problem.
Principal shareholders commanded all facets of corporate affairs, including board decisions, the selection of directors or auditors, and shareholders' meetings.18 Principal shareholders singlehandedly appointed directors and auditors. Candidates were selected from company employees, with one of the most important
See Jong-ho Na & Young-shin Yoon, Chae-bol gae-hyuk (2) [Reform of the
Chaebol (2)], CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Jan. 3, 1998, at 11. A classic example occurred in 1994 when the Chairman of the Dong Ah group unilaterally announced, without considering shareholder interests, that his construction
company accepted moral responsibility for a collapsed bridge and would donate 150 billion won (U.S. $125 million) to the city of Seoul to rebuild it. See
Hyo-sang Kang, Dae-gi-up oh-nub 'dok-joo' man-ta [Many Owners of Large Conglomerates Act "Unilaterallyl, CHOSUN ILBO, May 10, 1996, at 11; Young-am
Park & Ik-won Lee, So-soo-joo-joo 'nae-mok-da-oh [Minority Stockholders, "Give
Us Our Share", BUSINESS (Seoul), Apr. 29, 1997, at 66.
17 See Keo-san Lee & Young-shin Yoon, Chae-bol gae-hyuk (7)[Reform of the
Chaebol (7)], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 8, 1998, at 9; Ui-joon Park, Gi-up mung-deulgae-ha-myun ge-man-keum go-tong-joon-da [Those that Harm Corporations Will
Suffer as Much], JOONGANG ILBO, Nov. 27, 1998, at 4; Seung-min Yoo, supra
note 12, at 18-19.
Outside directors or auditors, on the other hand, did not exist until recently. The Korea Stock Exchange ("KSE") required listed companies to elect
one outside director in 1998 and to have outside directors comprise 25% of the
board in 1999. See KSE, Securities Listing Regulations, art. 48-5 (as amended
Feb. 14, 1998). Previously, only certain public enterprises and financial institutions were required to have outside directors. See Public Enterprise Management Structure Improvement and Privatization Act, Law No. 5379 of 1997 (as
amended Law No. 5690 of 1999), art. 5 Public Enterprise Management Structure Improvement and Privatization Act, Law No. 5379 of 1997 (as amended
Law No. 5690 of 1999), art. 5; Presidential Implementing Decree, Decree No.
11395 of 1984 (as amended Decree No. 15513 of 1997), art. 12; Government
Invested Institutions Management Act, Law No. 3690 of 1983 as amended Law
16

No. 5376 of 1997), art. 11. For a more in depth discussion of the adoption of
the outside directors system in Korea, see Bok-ki Hong, Sa-woe-i-sa-jae-do-ui

jung-chak-gwa ge hwal-sung-hwa [The Establishmentand Promotion ofan Outside
DirectorSystem], 37 SANC-JANG-HYUP 7 (1998).
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criteria being personal loyalty to the principal shareholders.19
Those nominated for director and auditor positions were then
universally approved at shareholders' meetings.
As a result, directors and auditors, thus held captive, could not
act independently from principal shareholders in carrying out
their respective functions. The board of directors did not make
decisions on behalf of the corporation, but instead gave strong
preference to the inclinations or passions of the principal shareholders." The failure of directors to perform their duties in an
objective and fiducial manner had especially acute consequences
under the Korean legal system, as directors in Korean corporations have a heightened responsibility due to their double function as officers. 1 Auditors thus also failed to act as internal
watchdogs monitoring the managerial decisions made by the
board.' Corporate decisions reflected the will of the principal
shareholders. In the end, all of the central internal controls that
were established under the KCC to monitor and manage corpo-

rate decision-making failed to operate.

See Hyo-sang Kang, supra note 16.
See Hyo-sang Kang et al., Gyung-young min-joo-hwa-ui gil (4): I.sa-hwoe.
neun "Yes'-man-ha-neun guh-soo-gi [The Road to Management Democracy (4):
Board of Directors Are a Rubber Stamp that Only Says "Yesi], CHOSUN ILBO,
May 14, 1996; Byung-tae Lee, Isa-hwoe woon-yong-ui hwal-sung-hwa bang-an [A
Proposalto Revive the Operation ofthe Board ofDirectors], 37 SANG-JANG-HYUP
139-141 (1998).
21 See Hee-chul Chung, Summary, supra note 6, at 49, 58; Yoo-suk Hong,
Sa-woe-i-sa-jae-ui do-ip-bo-da-neun up-moo-dam-dang-i-sa-Jae-uipyae-Ji.reul [Abol.
ishing the OperationDirectorSystem InsteadofAdopting an Outside DirectorsSystem], L. TIMES (Seoul), Apr. 9, 1998, at 6; Byung-tae Lee, supra note 20, at 13941; Jong-ho Na & Young-shin Yoon, Chae-bol gae-hyuk (4) [Reform of the Chaebol(4)], CHOSUNILBO, Jan. 5, 1998, at 11.
2 See KCC art. 412; see also Dong-yoon Chung, supra note 13, at 358;
Byung-tae Lee, supra note 20, at 146. Outside accounting audits, which are
mandatory for listed companies, were ineffective because accountants were
rarely held accountable. The Korean Supreme Court's 1997 decision that upheld a finding that Chongun Company, a major accounting firm, was liable f6r
its improper accounting was considered one of the first of its kind. See Judgment of Sept. 12, 1997, Dae-bup-won [Supreme Court], 96 Da 41991; Hup
Choi, Go-min-ha-neun hwoe-ge-bup-in [Worried Accounting Firms], CHOSUN
ILBO, Sept. 21, 1997. Another egregious example of improper accounting involved the collapse of Kia Motors, when it was discovered that over three trillion won [U.S. $2.5 billion] was not accounted for in their financial records.
See Jung-jae Lee, 'Bbung-twi-gi' gwan-haeng-i hwoe-gae boo-shil ki-wuh ["Ballooning"PracticeBredImproperAccounting],JOONGANG ILBO, Aug. 18, 1998.
19
20
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MarginalizedNonprincipalShareholders

Nonprincipal shareholders, on the other hand, played a marginal role in corporate affairs. Not only did they lack influence,
but they also generally remained passive actors. First, a barrage
of regulatory obstacles thwarted nonprincipal shareholders from
more active participation in corporate policy. Most of the minimum holding requirements for exercising various shareholder
rights were set at the prohibitively high level of five percent of
the total issued stock, which effectively froze out many shareholders from participating in corporate affairs.'
With listed companies averaging 62.3 billion won (U.S. $52
million) in capital stock in 1997, a five percent holding requirement, for instance, meant that interested stockholders would have
to amass over 3.1 billion won (U.S. $2.6 million) in shares to exercise their shareholder rights.24 This threshold requirement,
therefore, served as an insurmountable obstacle for most small investors. Shareholder rights were seldom, if ever, exercised.25 One
indicator of the difficulties shareholders experienced in taking action is that, until recently, meaningful shareholder litigation
never existed in Korea.26 Institutional investors, on the other
hand, who could have played a pivotal role, could not participate
in corporate affairs because they were limited to shadow voting
for customer accounts.27

One of the main reasons why policy makers kept the minimum holding requirements so high was because they wished to
2 See Chul-song Lee, So-soo-joo-joo-gwon-ui shil-hyo-sung gum-to [Review of
the Effectiveness ofMinority ShareholderRights], 35 SANG-JANG-HYUP 7 (1997).
24

See KOREA LISTED CO. ASS'N, SANG-JANG-HWOE-SA-YON-GAM 1998

[LISTED COMPANIES ALMANAC 1998], 1998, at 53. All foreign exchange calculations in this Article are calculated at U.S. $1 = 1200 won. This calculation
was made on a par value basis; the actual market value would be, of course,
even higher.
' See infra Section 3.3.
26 See Dong-yoon Chung, Too-ja-ja-bo-ho-reul wui-han so-song-jae-do-ae
gwan.han yon-goo [Research Paperon Litigation Procedures to Protect Investors],
35 SAN--JANG-HYUP 27 (1997); Chul-song Lee, supra note 23.
2 See Securities Investment Trust Business Act, supra note 1, arts. 25, 25-2;
Securities Investment Company Act, supra note 1, art. 31; Jae-won Lee, Sangjang-hwoe-sa-ae it-suh-suh gi-gwan-too-ja-ja-uiyok-hal [The Role of InstitutionalInvestors in Listed Companies], 17 COM. L. REV. 161, 167-77 (1998) (discussing the
various limitations that institutional investors faced); Seung-il Hong & Jung-jae
Lee, Gi-gwan-too-ja-ga ji-boon-do joo-chong ui-gyul-gwon joo-gi-ro [Institutional
Investors to be Granted Voting Rights],JOONGANG ILBO, Feb. 7, 1998, at 10.
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protect management. 21 Policy makers believed that because management needed to make swift and decisive judgments, it could
not be burdened by outside pressures such as shareholders. Concerns also existed that if minimum holding requirements were
lowered, they would be abused by bad faith shareholders, and
companies would be immobilized by an onslaught of litigation
from disgruntled shareholders.29 Some also claimed that racketeers would acquire shares and threaten to cause trouble at shareholders' meetings, extorting payoffs in return for their cooperation. The recent increase in directors' liability insurance has been
cited as another negative aspect and added expense of the new
shareholding requirements.3"
Given the Korean context, however, these arguments remain
unpersuasive. First, natural barriers to litigation deter already
nonlitigious Koreans. Litigation is time-consuming, expensive,
and involves public exposure. Furthermore, Korea does not allow class action suits.
The modified minimum holding threshold still requires a substantial sum of shares. With the average total market value of Korean listed companies at approximately 228
billion won (U.S. $190 million), one percent of the total shares
would require shareholders with 2.28 billion won (U.S. $1.9 million) worth of stock to unite forces.3 2

21 See Chul-song Lee, supra note 23. Management was also granted protection as a means to promote the newly established financial market because
many companies were reluctant to list their shares on the market out of fear
they would lose control. See Joon Park, Symposium: CapitalMarket andFinan-

cial Service in the PacificRim: Prospectfir Harmonization,28 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 893 (1997). See generally JUNG-RYUM KIM, HAN-GOOK-GYUNGJAE-JUNG-CHEK 30-NYUN-SA [30 YEARS OF KOREAN ECoNOMIc HISTORY]
278-84 (1995) (discussing the history of policies implemented to induce Korean
companies to go public).
29 See generally Korea Center for Free Enterprises (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.cfe.org> (discussing more in depth the potential problems of
enhancing shareholder rights in Korea).
30 See Joanna Slater, Running for Cover: Directors Seek Insurance Against
Liability,FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 4, 1999, at 47 (discussing the increase to approximately 100 new policies in 1998 from practically none in 1997).
31 See Dong-yoon Chung, supra note 13 (discussing the need for Korea to
adopt the U.S. class action system or the German Verbandsklage system). A
draft law for class actions in securities-related cases has been presented to the
National Assembly, but has yet to be adopted. See The National Assembly of
the Republic of Korea (visited Nov. 1, 1999) < http://www.assembly.go.kr >.
32 See KSE, 368 Joo-shik [Stock] 12, Apr. 1999.
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Unlike Japan, the activity of racketeers has been marginal at
best. 33 Despite the recently lowered Securities Exchange Act
("SEA") threshold, there have been only a few reported shareholder derivative suits, all of which have occurred since 1997. 34
The concerns about extortionist litigation have not materialized,
and if any concerns still exist regarding extortion-oriented or bad
faith litigation, many observers have pointed out that the courts
can prevent such actions from taking place.35
When one weighs the consequences of an overprotective and
unbridled management that lacks accountability versus the alleged
need for speedy and decisive decision making, it appears that the
government's overall policy intentions over the years have outlived their initial purpose.
Korean shareholders were also generally not interested in participating in corporate governance. Most shareholders, in fact,
did not even realize that they had rights. 36 The primary focus for
Korean shareholders was short-term gains rather than long-term
investment. 37 This short-term investment strategy consequently
led to 8little loyalty or interest in the affairs of corporate manage3
ment.
Nonprincipal shareholders, therefore, lacked the ability and
interest to participate in corporate affairs. As testimony to the
marginal role of shareholders, shareholders' meetings became
symbolic events held according to predetermined scripts that
" See Edward Lincoln, Behind the Chrysanthemum Curtain,ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Nov. 19, 1997, at 12; Question Time inJapan,ECONOMIST, May 1, 1999,
at 61.
' Korea First Bank, Korea Telecom, and Samsung Electronics are the only
recent examples. See infra Sections 4.3, 4.4; notes 180, 248; Chul-song Lee,supra note 23, at 7 ("[T]he Commercial Code provision governing derivative actions for practical purposes has been dead paper.").
31 See Ki-won Choi, IMF ui geuk-bok-eul wui-han sang-bup-gae-jung bang.
hyang I) [How the Korean Commercial Code Should Be Amened to Overcome
the IMF Situation (I)], L. TIMES (Seoul), Apr. 16, 1998, at 14; Gyo-chang Kim,
Sang-bup-jung hwoe-sa-pyun-ui gae-jung-ui-gyun [An Opinion on Amending the
Stock CorporationSection of the Commercial Code], L. TIMES (Seoul), Mar. 12,
1998, at 14.
36 See Scourge of the Chaebol,ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 68.
37 For instance, the average length of ownership for individual investors
was 1.2 months between January and July of 1999, 1.9 months in 1998, and 4.1
months in 1997. See KSE Press Release, Aug. 21, 1999 (on file with author).

See infra Section 3.8 for further discussion on how the low dividend policy played an important role in the short-term investment strategy of most Korean shareholders.
38
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merely rubber-stamped major board decisions.39 In fact, the overall lack of protection for the interests of nonprincipal shareholders was considered to be one of the major barriers to foreign investment.40
2.3.

The Vulnerability ofthe Korean CorporateParadigm:
The Case of the Chaebols

The results of this lapse in corporate regulation is best illustrated by the cbaebol, or family-owned conglomerates, that maintain an overwhelming position in the Korean economy. 4' First, as
principal shareholders, the chieftains of Korea's cbaebol conglomerates took full advantage of the lack of internal controls and
checks and balances in Korean corporations. They dominated entire conglomerates and controlled dozens of subsidiaries
and re42
lated companies while avoiding any accountability.
These principal shareholders of the cbaebol conglomerates
usually held positions as "Chairmen," yet they would officially
register themselves as directors in only the major corporations

" On the ineffectual nature of Korean shareholders' meetings, seeROGER
L. JANELLI & DAWNHEE YIM, MAKING CAPITALISM: THE SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF A SOUTH KOREAN CONGLOMERATE (Stan-

ford Univ. Press 1993); Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 14; Scourge of the Chae.
bol, supra note 36 ("Time was that shareholders' meetings in South Korea were
about as rowdy as a party congress in the communist North; often the entire
agenda was wrapped up in only a few minutes.").
40

See Soo-geun Oh, supra note 15.

See Mufson, supra note 10. The financial sector, which saw the collapse
of such firms as Koryo Securities, Dongsuh Securities, Daedong Bank, Dongnam Bank, Kyunggi Bank, Chungchung Bank, Korea First Bank, and Seoul
Bank, also serves as a prime example of the failed Korean corporate paradigm.
See Schuman, Piling On, supra note 12; Michael Schuman, Tangled Web: Hanbo
Steel Default Shows Shift in Government Policy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
1997, at 1 [hereinafter Schuman, Tangled Web]. See generally Ungki Lim, Pat.
terns of Ownership Structure and Their Characteristicsin Korean Conglomerates:
With Cases af the 30 Largest Chaebols (on file with author) (offering a comprehensive study of the ownership structure of the top 30 chaebols).
42 See Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 14; Seung-wook Chung, Joo-shikhwoe-sa ji-bae-joo-joo-ui bup-juk chaet-im-aegwan-han yon.goo [A Study on the Le.
gal Liabilities of the PrincipalShareholdersin Corporations](1998) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Seung-wook Chung, Shareholders];Seung-wook Chung, Dae-gi-up-ae it-suhsub sa-shil-sang i-sa-ui cbaek-im.gwa ge-han.gye [The Responsibilities and Limitations of De Facto Directors in Large Corporations], 38 SANG-JANG-HYUP 91
(1998) [hereinafter Seung-wook Chung, Directors].
41
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within the conglomerate.43 This overall structure allowed chieftains to minimize their legal responsibility." Chairmen, furthermore, reigned over conglomerates with only a marginal portion
of the outstanding shares, often amounting to less than three percent.4" Companies within a conglomerate were instead held together through an interlocking web of cross shareholding owner.46avie
ship between related and sister companies.
They avoided
assuming legally binding positions and limited their personal investment risk while, at the same time, being the principal of the
conglomerate.
Chairmen dominated directors and auditors. Nonprincipal
shareholders, in turn, did not provide any monitoring pressure.
Unlike the corporate governance systems in Japan or continental
Europe, financial intermediaries failed to offer any supervisory
discipline.4 ' The chance of being held accountable became remote, and investment risk exposure was minimal.
Chaebol
chairmen naturally gravitated to a business strategy that emphasized diversification, size, and market share over profitability and
shareholder value. 48 From this perspective, the interests of the enNone of the leading cbaebols has been ever controlled by a woman.
4 See Seung-wook Chung, Directors,supra note 42.
4s See KSE Press Release, Sept. 16, 1999 (on file with author). See generally
Hee-kab Kang, Woo-ri-na.ra-ui Gi-up-ji-bae-goo.jo-ui ip-bup-ron.juk gum-to [Review of the Legislative Theory Behind Korea's Corporate Governance]39 SANGJANG-HYUP 20, 28 (1999). To curb their influence, one observer has suggested
limiting the voting rights of these principal shareholders. See Hee-chul Chung,
Problems,supra note 6, at 12-13.
41 In the case of the 10 largest chaebols, the principal stake of chaebol
chairmen has in fact increased from 26.63% to 34.6% as a result of cross ownership and other family interests since the 1997 financial crisis. See KSE Press Release, supra note 45; Samuel Lee, Korean Conglomerates Remain Entrenched,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in
4'

Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1162-63 (1998).
See Coffee, supra note 4.
'7

48 This overall corporate ownership structure can be traced to Korea's industrial policy. In an effort to industrialize the economy through chaebol cmglomerates, Korean policymakers believed that Korean corporations should be
protected. See Namju Cho, Korea Takes New Step to Spur Mergers,ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 1 (calling Korean corporations "often-coddled") [hereinafter Namju Cho, Korea Takes New Step]. But see The Apologist: The World
Blames South Korea's Huge Conglomerates for the Country's Economic Meltdown-Bae le-Dong Has the Thankless Task of Defending 7hem, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 29, 1998, at 62 (profiling an economist for thechaebols lobbying association who argues that the chaebol's excessive borrowing and emphasis on market
share were necessary) [hereinafter The Apologist].
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tire chaebol conglomerate were placed above the well-being of individual corporations and their respective shareholders. Dividends, for instance, were kept to a minimum.
In the initial stages, the chaebol model arguably held some advantages, such as efficient and speedy decision-making. 9 Yet any
management system that operates without adequate supervision
or monitoring cannot remain internationally competitive. The
longer such a system persists and the larger a company becomes,
the greater will be the agency costs and the subsequent decline in
efficiency. The chaebol's corporate structure exemplified these
characteristics.
One person dominated all the companies in an entire conglomerate without any effective checks or balances or accountability. This management structure eventually became plagued
with inefficiencies and irregularities. Chaebols often became nonspecialized, bloated behemoths that were largely sustained by
debt."0 At their worst, the conglomerate culture became conducive to illicit activities adverse to the interests of individual corporations and their respective shareholders. Funds from profitable
companies were shifted to support new and weaker companies
through transfer pricing and cross guarantees." More egregious
examples included the expropriation of company funds, the creation of slush funds, and self-dealing by the principal shareholders." To conceal these practices from shareholders and regula"4 See Seung-min Yoo, supra note 12, at 13-15 (providing a comparison of
the various asserted strengths and weaknesses of the chaebol's concentrated
management style).
51 See The Apologist, supra note 48 (discussing how the chaebols started going bankrupt as they became unable to pay interest charges on skyrocketing
debts out of cash flow). The defunct Hanbo Steel was one of the most overleveraged companies in Korea before it collapsed, having amassed five trillion
won in debt, over 22 times its equity. See Schuman, Tangled Web, supra note
41.
51

See infra Section 4.4.

See Mufson, supra note 10; Seung-min Yoo, supra note 12, at 17-18. Indicative of the state of mind of many chaebol owners, when charged with misappropriating customer funds, the former chairman of the defunct Kuhpyong
Group replied at a National Assembly Audit Committee hearing, "I didn't
52

know that you were not supposed to misappropriate customers' funds .... I

didn't know which funds were the customers' and which were the company's." See Hee-chun Cho, Go.gaek-don yoo-yong bool-bup-in-jool mol-latdla/Na seung-yul hwoe-jang gook-gam bal-uhn [Didn't Know It Was illegal to Mis-

appropriate Customer's Funds: Chairman Na Seung-yul Statement at National
Audit Hearing],CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 4, 1998, at 33.
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tors, opaqueness instead of transparency became the standard
practice of choice. 3 As chaebols became uncompetitive and vulnerable to outside shocks, the system began to unravel gradually,
outliving most of the merits it once had.
The failure of corporate regulation, therefore, ultimately contributed to the spectacular failures of such mainstay conglomerates as Daewoo, Hanbo, Kia, and Daenong. 4 Given the dominant position of the chaebol, their failures had multiple
repercussions throughout the Korean economy and helped precipitate the severity of the 1997 financial crisis.
3. THm NEW KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE

To correct these various structural problems, the KCC was
amended three times in the past four years. The 1995 amendments came after more than ten years of review and became effective on October 1, 1996. The preamble of the 1995 KCC provides that one of the primary purposes of the revisions was to
"enhance the international competitiveness of Korean companies." 5 The major focus of the 1998 amendments was to address
the failures that were exposed during the financial crisis. 6 The
1998 amendments included provisions to simplify the mergers
and acquisitions process, increase the accountability of de facto
directors, and strengthen minority shareholder rights. The 1999
amendments, however, included regulations concerning stock options and audit committees. The various amendments that occurred in 1995, 1998, and 1999 will be reviewed by subject matter,
with an emphasis on changes affecting corporate governance.

s See Soo-geun Oh, supranote 15, at 73-74.
Among the top 30 major chaebol conglomerates, 11 have been taken
over, have filed for bankruptcy, or are undergoing workout proceedings. The
failed cbaebols, along with their old rankings in parentheses, include Daewoo
(2nd), Kia (8th), Halla (12th), Hanbo (14th), Jinro (19th), New Core (25th),
Sammi (26th), and Dainong (34th). See Dong-han Lee, Sbil-pae yon-gu: 2 sae
chong-soo dok-dan-ae in-uijang-mak' kka-ji [Study of Failure:From the Autocracy
of Second Generation Chieftains to Being Sheltered by 'Curtains of People],
CHOSUN ILBO, Apr. 19, 1999, at 13.
5 1995 KCC preamble.
56 See 1998 KCC preamble.
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Directors

One of the main objectives of revising the KCC was to make
directors more accountable. Under the previous legal regime, directors had an obligation to their company based on a general
standard called the "duty of diligence as a good custodian (sunlyang-han-gwan-li-ja-ui-ju-ui-ui-mu),"which was similar to a combination of the duty of good faith and fair dealing."7 This general
standard was not based on a provision in the Commercial Code,
but applied to corporate directors indirectly through reference to
Article 681 of the Civil Code. 8 Directors, in turn, neglected their
roles as good custodians or fiduciaries.5 9 To heighten awareness
of the fundamental responsibility that directors owe to their corporations, an explicit fiduciary duty has now been imposed upon
directors. 6' Under this provision, directors must fulfill their obligations in a fiduciary manner on behalf of the company as provided by the law, as well as by the articles of incorporation.61
Secondly, the new KCC requires directors to act more vigilantly in protecting the interests of their company. Directors
now have a duty to immediately report to the company's statutory auditor any facts they learn that may "significantly injure"
the company.62 This provision affirmatively forces directors to be
more attentive in protecting the interests of shareholders. The
potential effectiveness of this new duty, however, will depend on
how the courts interpret the term "significant injury." (Similarly,
the board of directors' minutes must now include the names of
any directors that objected to any decisions, and the reasons why
they objected. 63 Not only did directors rarely object to board decisions, but board minutes rarely provided any detailed informa"' Ki-won Choi, supra note 1. Some believe that, other than symbolically,
the fiduciary duty and the general due diligence standards are not significantl
distinguishable, and propose instead that Korea follow the German model,
placing the burden ofproof on directors to properly carry out their duties. See

id.
" See KCC art. 1 (providing that the Civil Code applies when a matter is
not covered by the KCC).
"' See infra Section 4 for various examples.
60 See 1998 KCC art. 382-3.
61 See id.
62 1995 KCC art. 412-2.
61 See 1999 KCC art. 391-3. Creditors can no longer inspect board minutes. See id.
art. 396.
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tion concerning any objections in the past. At the same time,
companies may now reject a shareholder's inspection request if
they provide a "reason."" If rejected, the shareholder must obtain
court approval for an inspection, placing the burden on the
shareholder, rather than the company.)
Thirdly, another significant amendment to the KCC is that
principal shareholders now may be considered to have the same
responsibilities and liabilities as directors under certain circumstances. Under the old regulatory framework, it was extremely
difficult to establish liability against principal shareholders." One
would have to either demonstrate that the principal shareholders
were de facto directors or pierce the corporate veil-both challenging tasks, given that the party making such an assertion has
the burden of proof. 66
The new KCC therefore provides that persons who "use their
influence to direct or participate in the corporate affairs of directors" can be held jointly and severally liable with the other directors of a company.' Persons who hold titles such as "honorary
chairman," "chairman," "president," "vice-president," or conduct
corporate affairs under the pretext of such titles, in particular,
will be deemed to be directors even if they are not registered directors.68 The principal shareholders who have dominated corporate decision-making can no longer avoid managerial liability
merely by not registering as directors. This new provision makes
it substantially easier to find principal shareholders accountable as
directors. They will be considered the same as other directors

64
65

See id art. 391-3; art. 396.

See Seung-wook Chung, Shareholders,supra note 42.
See Seung-wook Chung, Directors,supra note 42, at 96-97; see also Judgment of June 11, 1985, Dae-bup-won [Supreme Court], 84 Daka 963 (finding
that under Article 395, a person does not have to be a registered director to be
considered a de facto representative director that could bind the company).
66

67
68

1998 KCC art. 401-2.

See id. art. 401-2, para. 1, subpara. 3.
69 Minority shareholders of Korea Telecom recently brought a case against
the government claiming that the government should be responsible under this
provision because it in fact dictated corporate affairs at Korea Telecom. See In-

soon Kim, Han-gook-tong-shin so-aek-joo-joo, jung-boo-aeJoo-oo-dae-pyo-so-song
[Korea Telecom Minority Shareholders Bring a Shareholder Derivative Action
Against the Government], MAEIL Bus. NEWS (Seoul), Apr. 12, 1999.
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with the same duties and responsibilities. As a result, many company chieftans are finally registering as directors.7'
The new KCC amendments also seek to accommodate the interests of small companies. First, corporations having less than
500 million won (U.S. $418,000) in paid-in capital, for example,
do not have an obligation to elect a minimum of three directors.71
This new provision allows small corporations to avoid the unnecessary burden of electing ghost directors who only lend their
name during the process of incorporation but do nothing else, a
common practice in the past.72 If a small corporation elects only
one director, all occasions where the KCC requires approval from
the board of directors will require instead approval from the
shareholders. 3
Finally, to enhance the efficiency of the board of directors,
several changes have been made. The entire board may now delegate certain functions to a subcommittee of directors.
Those
functions that cannot be delegated include such matters as the
election or termination of the representative director and the
proposal of issues that require shareholder approval. Furthermore, unless provided otherwise in the articles of incorporation,
directors may now participate in board meetings
through simul75
taneous audiovisual electronic transmission.
3.2.

Auditors andAudit Committees

One of the most dubious positions in a Korean corporation
belongs to that of statutory auditors.76 Auditors were established
7o See Jong-young Kim, Geu.rup-hwoe.jang-jae pye-ji... joo.ryuk.sa gyung.

young jip-joong [Abolishing of the Conglomerate ChairmanSystem... Concentrating Management ofMain Companies],MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Feb. 28, 1998.
71 See 1998 KCC art. 383.
' For a critical view of this amendment, see Ki-won Choi,supranote 35.
73 See 1998 KCC art. 383, para. 4.
14 See 1999 KCC art. 393-2.
71 See id. art. 391.
76 See Chan-hyung

Chung, supra note 14, at 14-15; see also Joon-young
Chung, Gi-up-gyung-young-too-myung-sung jae.go.wa gam-sa.jae-do gae.sun [Enhancing CorporateManagement Transparency and Improving the Audit System],
35 SANC-JANG-HYIuP 76 (1997). Auditors are separated into internal auditors

and external auditors. External auditors are limited to accounting audits and
are required for all companies with more than seven billion won (U.S. $5.8
million in total assets under the Law Concerning External Audits of Corporations, Law No. 3297 of 1980 (as amended Law No. 6108 of 2000). Internal
auditors are governed under the KCC. See KCC arts. 409-415; seealso Young-il
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as internal institutions to monitor corporate affairs and the decision making of directors on behalf of shareholders,"' yet they
were unable to fulfill their function. The recent amendments
seek to strengthen the authority of auditors so they can effectively act as internal watchdogs, as intended under the Commercial Code. For instance, companies can now establish an audit
committee to replace the functions of the auditor."
First, to enhance their standing, auditors will receive protection from unjust termination."9 Auditors commonly feared retaliatory discharge if they raised any challenges against management in the interests of the corporation or its shareholders. To
allay these concerns, auditors now have a guaranteed opportunity
to inform all shareholders of the circumstances of their termination.
Auditors also have been empowered with the right to convene
a shareholders' meeting."0 In the past, only the board of directors
or shareholders who met a high holding requirement could call a
shareholders' meeting. Auditors, especially outside auditors who
are required for large companies, have gained tremendous authority as a result of this provision."1 They can unilaterally call shareholders' meetings in order to inform shareholders, take votes on
controversial issues, and confirm board decisions.
Finally, the term of office for auditors has been extended from
two years to three years, in order to match the length of the term
for directors.8" It was believed that longer terms would provide
auditors more job security and more independent authority.
In addition to granting these various protections, the new
KCC limits the qualifications of auditors to guarantee their objectivity. An individual can no longer be both an auditor of a parent
company and a director of a subsidiary company at the same
Yoo, Sang-geun-gam-sa-wa sa-woe-gam-sa-jae-do.ui do-ib-ui-ui-wa woon-yong-hyoyul-hwa bang-an [The Importance of Adopting, and Improving the Management
Effectiveness of, PermanentAuditors and the Outside Auditor System], 37 SANGJANG-HYUP 42 (1998).

r See KCC art. 412; see also Dong-yoon Chung, supranote 13, at 358.
See 1999 KCC art. 415-2.
7 See 1995 KCC art. 409-2.
80 See id.art. 412-3.
81 See infra Section 4.4.
78

See 1995 KCC art. 410. The term of office for auditors was extended
from one year to two years in 1984. See Ju-chan Sonn, Reflections, supra note
6, at 34.
82
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time." Parent company directors tend to have a strong influence
over the directors of a subsidiary. Absent this position, auditors
of a parent company could have a conflict of interest when auditing decisions made by the parent company's directors concerning
their influence over a subsidiary's directors. If auditors of a parent company were jointly allowed to be directors of a subsidiary,
they would be forced to audit affairs relating to themselves. 4 In
contrast, a person may be an auditor of both a parent and a subsidiary company, or a director of a parent company and an auditor of a subsidiary company without implicating conflict of interest concerns.
If an audit committee is established based on the terms of a
company's articles of incorporation, the committee must consist
of at least three directors."5 In electing audit committee members,
the committee cannot consist of more than one-third of the following categories: (1) an inside director or a person who was an
inside director within the last two years; (2) the largest shareholder, his or her spouse, or direct lineal relative; (3) a director,
auditor, or employee of the largest corporate shareholder, a parent or subsidiary company, or a major interested company; (4) a
spouse or direct lineal relative of a director; and (5) a director,
auditor or employee of another company for which the director
also acts as a director. Furthermore, audit committee members
can only be terminated by a vote of over two-thirds of the board
of directors. These various requirements were stipulated to ensure the independence of the audit committee.

3.3.

Strengthening ShareholderRights

Among the various amendments to the KCC, some of the
most significant changes involved the new measures to strengthen
the neglected rights of shareholders. The 1995 KCC, 1998 KCC,
and 1999 KCC sought to make it easier for shareholders to exercise their existing rights and also sought to establish new rights on
their behalf. These changes led to a seismic shift in the overall
scheme of corporate regulation.
83 See 1995 KCC art. 411; see also Ju-chan Sonn et al., Sang-bup-gae.jung-anhae-sul [Explanatory Notes on Proposed Amendments to the Commercial Code]
139 (Bupmoonsa Publishers 1995) [hereinafterExplanatoryNotes].
" See ExplanatoryNotes, supra note 83, at 139.
81 See 1999 KCC art. 415-2.
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Table 1: Recent Amendments to the KCC and SEA86
Shareholder Right
Type

KCC
1995 1

SEA
199888

1997'9

Feb.

S199810

Requesting
termination of

May
199891
N/C

Jan. 2000r2

5%

3%

1%
(0.5%)

0.5%
(0.25%)

5%

1%

1%
(0.5%)

0.5%
(0.25%)

N/C

0.25%
(0.125%)

5%

1%

1%
(0.5%)

0.05%

0.01%

0.005%

5%

3%

3%
(1.5%)

N/C

N/C

1.5%
(0.75%)

5%

3%

3%
(1.5%)

1%
(0.5%)

N/C

0.5%
(0.25%)

5%

3%

3%
(1.5/)

N/C

N/C

1.5%
(0.750/)

5%

3%

3%
(1.5%)

0.5%
(0.25%)

N/C

0.25%
(0.125%)

-

3%

Making a share-

-

3%

holder proposal

_.5(0.5%)

0.25%
(0.125%)

directors &
auditors

Seeking injunctive
action against
illegal acts

Bringing shareholder derivative
actions
Convening a special shareholders'
meeting
Compelling
production of
financial records
for inspection

Appointing an
inspector to examine corporate affairs, records, &

financial status
Terminating a
liquidator
Requesting cumulative voting

Requesting
dissolution

10%

-

-

1%

N/C

N/C

0.5%

(0.25%)
10%

....

I

86 The numbers in parentheses apply to listed or registered companies with
at least 100 billion won in paid-in capital. SEA applies to shareholders with at
least six months ownership. January 2000 revisions to the SEA only apply to
certain securities companies with at least two trillion won in assets. N/C signifies no change.
87 KCC, as amended by Law No. 5053 of 1995 (effective Oct. 1, 1996).
88 KCC, as amended by Law No. 5591 of 1998 (effective Dec. 28, 1998, except for the cumulative voting provision, which became effective on June 28,
1998).
89 SEA, as amended by Law No. 5254 of 1997 (effective Apr. 1, 1997).
o SEA, as amended by Law No. 5521 of 1998 (effective Apr. 1, 1998).
91 SEA, as amended by Law No. 5539 of 1998 (effective May 25, 1998).
92 SEA, as amended by Law No. 6176 of 2000 (effective Apr. 1, 2000).
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First and foremost, although the minimum holding requirements for exercising various shareholder rights remain high,93
considerable progress has been achieved in that these requirements were significantly lowered. Overall, the new KCC has reduced the minimum holding standards required to exercise the
following rights:94 (1) requesting a court to terminate directors
and auditors for improper or illegal acts in contravention of any
law or the articles of incorporation, reduced from five percent to
three percent;" (2) seeking injunctive action against illegal acts in
contravention of any law or the articles of incoToration of a director, reduced from five percent to one percent;9 (3) bringing
shareholder derivative actions, reduced from five percent to one
percent; 7 (4) convening a special shareholders' meeting, reduced
from five percent to three percent; (5) compelling production of
financial records for inspection, reduced from five percent to
three percent;99 (6) requesting a court to appoint an Inspector to
examine corporate affairs, corporate records, and financial status,
reduced from five percent to three percent;" and (7) terminating
a liquidator, reduced from five percent to three percent.0 1
As noted above, it is now easier for shareholders to seek the
termination of a director. In the past, when a director committed
an "improper act," or violated "a law or the articles of incorporation," shareholder attempts to terminate such a director were often stymied at the shareholders' meeting due to the dominance of
the principal shareholders. 2 Dissenting shareholders with only

' The holding requirements for shareholders of listed companies were
fast lowered at the end of 1996. See SEA, Law No. 5254 of 1997; supra Table
1.
" This summary of percentages excludes shares that do not have voting
rights, such as most preferred shares. For a summary of litigation-related investor rights, see Dong-yoon Chung,supra note 26, at 41-42.

1sSee 1998 KCC art. 385.
96 See id.art. 402.
17 See id. art. 403.
98

See id. art. 366.

" See id. art. 466. Ki-won Choi argues that since shareholder derivative
suits are in fact impossible without the right to inspect financial records that
these two rights should have the same requirement of one percent. See Ki-won
Choi, supra note 35.
'1 See 1998 KCC art. 467.
101 See id. art. 539.
102 Id. art. 385.
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three percent of the total shares can now request the termination
before a competent court after such a shareholders' meeting. This
provides an important means by which to hold directors more accountable, especially those protected by the dominant shareholder.
In the case of the shareholder derivative action, the new law
not only lowered the holding requirement, but also added a critical feature. 3 Under the new law, the one percent holding requirement for bringing a derivative action only has to be met
when the action commences and need not be maintained for the
duration of the case. This change greatly facilitates the ability of
small investors to sustain derivative actions, especially because
most investors in Korea do not hold onto their shares for extended periods."° Overall, the lower minimum ownership requirements mark an important step in empowering shareholders
to oversee the actions of directors. As a result, the number of
shareholder actions has risen significantly."0 '
In addition to lowering the various holding requirements,
both the 1998 and 1999 amendments established several new
shareholders' rights. First, as provided in the articles of incorporation, shareholders can now execute their votes in writing without actually attending the shareholders' meeting.0 6 This makes it
substantially easier for shareholders to exercise their rights. Second, shareholders can request cumulative voting when electing directors."0 7 Shareholders with at least three percent of the total
shares can request cumulative voting when more than two directors are elected. Companies must accept such a request unless
they have added a provision in their articles of incorporation to
exclude it. Amending the articles of incorporation requires a spe-

103

See id. art. 403, para. 5.

104

See KSE Press Release, supra note 37.
See infra Section 4.

105

See 1999 KCC art. 366-3.
107 See 1998 KCC art. 382-2. One observer argues that Korea is not ready
for the cumulative voting system because it will create confusion. See Ki-won
Choi, supra note 35. Choi roposes instead a new system of corporate governance whereby 50% of the "oard would be elected as before, 25% would be
elected with each shareholder's voting rights being limited to a maximum of
3%, and the remaining 25% would be elected by large creditors. See id. For
companies with more than 10,000 workers, a representative from the workers
would be elected. See id.
106
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cial majority vote at a shareholders' meeting, which may be a
considerable burden.108
One problem with this provision is that, unlike the other
provisions of the 1998 KCC, it did not become effective until
June 28, 1999. Any election of directors preceding that date did
not have to be executed with cumulative voting, and companies
were granted a chance to adopt exclusionary provisions to prohibit it. According to the Korea Stock Exchange, of the 516 listed
companies with fiscal years ending in December 1998, 386 companies, or 74.8%, managed to enact provisions excluding cumulative voting." 9 The remaining 130 companies, or 26.2%, and those
companies that have not adopted such exclusionary provisions by
June 1999, will have to adopt cumulative voting.
Another important right created for shareholders is the right
to propose items to be placed on the agenda of a shareholders'
meeting."0 Interested shareholders with at least three percent of
the total issued shares must first submit their proposals to the responsible director six weeks before the shareholders' meeting.
Shareholders can request that their proposal items be included
along with other material and notices sent to other shareholders.
The board of directors must accept a shareholder proposal thus

See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
See Yoon-jae Han, 12 wol gyol-san-bup-in 75% ]ib-jung-tu.pyo-jae do-ip anki-ro [75% of Companies with Fiscal Years Ending in December Decide Not to
Adopt Cumulative Voting], CHOSuN ILBO, Mar. 30, 1999; Sung-won Lee, Daeduk-san-up deung 22 sa aek-myun bun-hal 12 wol bup-in jung-gwan byun-gyung
[Companies with Accounting Years Ending in December ChangeArticles of Incorporation: Daeduk Industries and 22 Other Comeanies Provide for Stock Splits],
MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 30, 1999. Citing the situation in Japan, Ki-won Choi
predicted that companies would just pass provisions to exclude the requirement or would elect directors on staggered terms. See Ki-won Choi, supra note
35.
10 See 1998 KCC art. 363-2.
The first reported case where a company accepted a shareholder proposal occurred on May 27, 1997, when Korea International Merchant Bank accepted a proposal to elect certain directors. See Sung-il
Hong, So-aek joo-joo jae-an chut gwan-chul [Minority Shareholder Proposal Acceptedfor the First Time], JOONGANG ILBO, May 28, 1997. See generally Hongryul Chun, Ju-ju-jae-an-jae-do-wasang-janggi-up-ui dae-ung [The ShareholderPro.
posal and How Listed Companies Should Respond], 38 SANG-JANG-HYUP 69
(1998); Jong-ho Kwon, Gyung-young-]a-gam-shi-soo-dan-eu-ro.suh wui-im.]ang.
gwon-yu-ui hyo-yul-sung [Effectiveness oJ Proxy Solicitationas a Means of Monitor.
ing Management], 17 COM. L. REV. 111 (1998). Shareholder proposals were
adopted for listed companies at the end of 1996. See SEA, supra note 93.
108

1
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submitted unless it contravenes a law or the articles of incorporation."'

Those who make a shareholder proposal may then request an
opportunity to explain their proposal at the shareholders' meeting."' Companies that fail to comply with the shareholder proposal provision may be subject to a fine of up to five million won
(U.S. $41,800)."' This vital provision grants shareholders the opportunity to voice their opinions on issues of concern to them,
instead of merely being limited to the agenda set by the company.
This provision is flawed, however, because it is not consistent
with the procedures by which to convene a shareholders' meeting. A company only has to give shareholders two weeks' notice
before convening a shareholders' meeting."' Hence, if shareholders receive only the minimal two weeks' notice, they will not
have sufficient time to submit a shareholder proposal, which requires six weeks' advance notice. This means that the shareholder
proposal provision can only be used if the shareholders themselves request a special shareholders' meeting. Otherwise, for
shareholders' meetings convened by the board of directors, shareholders can only guess when the actual meetings will be held and
submit shareholder proposals six weeks in advance of that estimated date. One company has already used this loophole, rescheduling a shareholders' meeting to avoid including a shareholder proposal made by several foreign funds.'
3.4.

Mergers

Another important reason for amending the KCC was to
overhaul the regulations concerning mergers. As testimony to
the significance of mergers, the merger provisions, originally part
of "Section 10 Dissolutions" under the old KCC, were moved to
a newly created section specifically entitled "Section 10 Mergers"
in the 1998 KCC. From one perspective, a more active mergers
and acquisitions market was viewed as a means of strengthening

...See 1998 KCC art. 363-2, para. 3.
112See id.
13

114

See id. art. 635, para. 1, subpara. 19-3.
See KCC art. 363.

11 See Jin-gun Chung, Mi-gook-gye fund, Nong-sbim-ae aek-myun-boon-hal
yo-goo [American Fund Requests Stock Split from Nongsbim], MAEIL Bus. NEWS,

Aug. 24, 1998.
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corporate governance.116 The lack of such external discipline was
one reason why principal shareholders could maintain low share
ownership and minimal risk exposure while dominating corporate affairs. The new provisions were also considered a means to
facilitate corporate restructuring efforts. Overall, the amendments of the merger section sought to streamline the merger procedures, enhance the protection of shareholders, and assure adequate protection for management."'
3.4.1.

StreamliningMergerProcedures

Various procedural modifications were made to facilitate the
merger process. First, the special majority voting procedure required for special resolutions, such as mergers or other major
corporate changes, was modified.'
Many public companies had
trouble meeting the quorum requirement for special resolutions,
which called for attendance at the shareholders' meeting by the
119
shareholders of at least one-half of all shares entitled to vote.
The special majority voting procedure now provides that a
merger may be approved with just a two-thirds vote of the shareholders who attend the shareholders' meeting. To ensure some
degree of representativeness, this two-thirds vote must consist of
at least one-third of the total shares entitled to vote. Thus, the
original mandatory quorum requirement for voting on a special
resolution was replaced with a simpler "voting quorum."
See Namju Cho, Korea Takes New Step, supra note 48.
See Dong-yun Chung, Hwoe-sa-ui hap-byung-jul-cha-uigan-so-hwa-waJooJoo-ui bo-ho [The Simplification of Merger Proceduresand the Protection of Sare.
holders], Public Hearing on the Amendments to the Commercial Code, Ministry of Justice, Apr. 1, 1998, at 11. This shareholder proposal right existed for
listed companies under the Securities Exchange Law and was first exercised by
shareholders of Korea International Merchant Bank in April 1997. See Gwangjin Oh, Han-woi-jong-geum no-jo geum-yung-gwon chut joo-Joojae-an-gwon heng.
sa [Korea International Merchant Bank Labor First to Exercise Shareholder Pro.
posalRightin FinancialIndustry],KOREA ECON. DAILY, Apr. 15, 1997.
" See 1995 KCC art. 434. Previously, the quorum requirement for"special resolutions" called for the attendance of shareholders representing at least
one-half of the total voting shares and a two-thirds approval among them. Because this quorum normally could not be met, unvoted shares that were deposited with the Korean Deposit Agency would be counted through shadow voting toward the quorum requirement. See SEA art. 174-6; see also Explanatory
Notes, supra note 83, at 151-53.
119 Once the quorum is met, special resolutions require the approval of at
least two-thirds of the total shares actually attending the shareholders' meeting.
See KCC art. 434.
116
117
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Another change to the new merger regulations allows companies to dispense with the final reporting requirements to shareholders.1 20 Under the previous provisions, after a merger was approved, but before the final merger registration, the board of
directors had to prepare a final report to shareholders at a special
shareholders' meeting regarding all matters relating to the proposed merger. 12' The drafters of the 1995 KCC believed that calling a shareholders' meeting solely for this purpose was unnecessary, especially because shareholders would have already
approved the merger, and the merger could not be undone or
changed at that time."z Therefore, under the new procedures, the
drafters provided that the company may instead disclose any information regarding the merger according to the public notice requirements in the company's articles of incorporation."
From another perspective, new mergers and acquisitions regulations were also needed to help desperate companies restructure
and attract capital following the credit crunch of the financial crisis. Many companies at the time sought to merge failing or
weaker subsidiaries with sister companies. One way to facilitate
corporate restructuring was the adoption of a short-form merger
procedure and a small-scale merger procedure.
Established in 1995, the short-form merger procedure was further modified under the 1998 KCC 24 Certain companies being
acquired can use the short-form merger procedure to substitute
the mandatory shareholder approval process with the mere acceptance of the board of directors. The short-form merger can be
used where the acquiring company purchases more than ninety
percent of the target company's stock or if all of the target company's shareholders agree to adopt the procedure.121 Short-form
mergers, therefore, allow companies to dispense with the requirement of convening a separate shareholders' meeting for ap-

120

See 1995 KCC art. 526; 1998 KCC art. 527.

"2 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 195.

See id. at 196.
See KCC art. 289.
124 See 1995 KCC art. 522; 1998 KCC art. 527-2.
125 See 1998 KCC art. 527-2. Under the old article 522 of the 1995 KCC,
when the short-form merger procedure was first established, the acquiring
company had to acquire 100% of the target company's shares or receive an approval by all of the target company's shareholders.
12

123
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proval. Subsidiaries controlled by parent companies, for instance,
can be absorbed in a simplified manner.
The new KCC also introduced a small-scale merger procedure
so that large acquiring companies could purchase smaller companies more easily. According to Article 527-3, a large acquiring
company can use the small-scale merger when it issues less than
five percent of its total shares to purchase a small company.1 26 In
small-scale mergers, the large acquiring company does not have to
obtain shareholder approval through a separate shareholders'
meeting. Such a meeting was deemed unnecessary because, given
the relatively small size of the purchase, the acquisition would not
affect the company substantially."
Finally, to accelerate the merger process, two approval deadlines were shortened. First, the time period allowed for creditors
to object to mergers has been reduced from a minimum of two
months to a minimum of one month. 121

Second, the new

amendments reduce the time needed to merge stock from three
months to one month. 129
3.4.2.

ProtectingMinority Shareholders'Interests

While the new KCC simplified various merger procedures to
facilitate the corporate restructuring process, it also sought to
guarantee that this general deregulation did not infringe on the interests of shareholders.130 Therefore, various shareholder rights
and disclosure requirements were concomitantly strengthened to
protect shareholders.
First, under the 1998 KCC, various documents must be made
available for inspection at the company's headquarters. During
the period extending from two weeks before the convening of the
shareholders' meeting to approve the merger, to six months after
the actual merger, the following documents must be made availSee 1998 KCC art. 527-3.
Recent examples of small-scale mergers have involved Kangwon Industries, Tong Yang Cement, Orion Electric, Han I1 E Wha, and Hyundai Engineering and Construction merging subsidiary or related companies.
126

127

121
129

See 1998 KCC art. 527-5.
See 1995 KCC art. 440.

For a discussion on how minority shareholders need further protection,
see Hyun-yoon Shin, Sang-bup-sanggi-up-gyul-hap-ui sa-jun-tong-jae-wa moon.ja ejum [The Prior Controls, and Their Problems, in Corporate Consolidation under
the Commercial Code], 18 COM. L. REV. 51 (1999).
130
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able to shareholders: the merger agreement, the final balance
sheets and profit and loss statements of the respective companies,
and a document explaining the allocation of shares to the target
company's shareholders.13 '
Subsequently, the board of directors must provide additional
post-merger disclosure. For a period of six months after the
merger, the directors must also provide information concerning
the status of objecting creditors, the total assets and liabilities assumed from the target company, the date of the merger, and
other information related to the merger.132 This information
must be made available to shareholders for inspection at the company's headquarters.
In the case of short-form mergers, the target company's shareholders must be notified within two weeks that a merger is proceeding without a shareholders' meeting. If they desire, the target
company's shareholders can, of course, waive this notice re3
quirement."
The notice may be given through the public notice
process or through direct notice to individual shareholders.
Finally, to use the small-scale merger procedure, the large acquiring company must state in the merger agreement that it did
not convene a formal shareholders' meeting. The large acquiring
company must also alert shareholders to the acquired company's
name, location of its headquarters, and the date of the merger
through either a public notice or individual notification.' However, a large acquiring company cannot use the small-scale merger
procedure if it has to pay more than two percent of its net assets
to purchase the small target company's shares.'
Shareowners
who own more than twenty percent of the total shares can also
demand that the acquiring company use the normal merger procedure instead of the small-scale procedure. 36 Furthermore,
shareholders who object to the small-scale merger may request

appraisal rights. 3

112

See 1998 KCC art. 522-2.
See id. art. 527-6.

13

See id. art. 527-2.

134

See id. art. 527-3.
See id. para. 1.
See id. para. 4.
See id. para. 5.

131

1
136
137
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Accommodating Management Concerns

The simplification of the mergers procedures also raised concerns among companies about the threats of hostile takeovers."
In response to these concerns, anyone that acquires more than ten
percent of the issued stock of another company must, in due
course, notify that company of their new ownership position to
provide sufficient notice to that company.139 This ten percent
disclosure rule was enacted to give fair warning so that threatened
companies would have an opportunity to defend themselves. In
particular, the effectiveness of this rule will depend on whether
acquisitions by related and interested shareholders will be effectively combined when calculating the ten percent threshold to
prevent circumvention.
As an ultimate means of protection, lawmakers granted companies the ability to restrict the transfer of shares. 4 A company
can require stockholders to obtain the board of directors' approval before they sell their shares. This restriction was added so
that closed corporations could maintain "mutual trust between
shareholders" by preventing unwanted shareholder participation."' It is therefore only supposed to apply to closed corporations and not to listed or public corporations.142 This restriction
only applies to newly issued shares and must be stated in the articles of incorporation; shareholders who are denied transfers may
claim appraisal rights."

'3

See Hup Choi, Woe-gook-in juk-dae-juk M&A sa-shil-sang shil.hyun uh-

ryup-da [Actually Difficult for Foreign Hostile M&As to Occur], CHOSUN ILBO,
Feb. 9, 1998.
139 See 1995 KCC art. 342-3. A similar five percent rule already exists under SEA art. 200-2.
140 See 1995 KCC art. 335.
141 ExplanatoryNotes, supra note 83, at 84.
142 See id.at 85-86. Listed companies are excluded from this restriction under the SEA.
143 In addition, if a company has decided to place this type of transfer restriction on a stock, convertible bond, or bond with warrant, then it must be
included in the various documents related to such securities instruments. Such

documents include the offer statements (1995 KCC arts. 302, 514, 5164), the
instrument certificates (1995 KCC arts. 356, 514, 516-4), and the securities instrument holder lists (1995 KCC arts. 514, 516-4). The information concerning
the restriction must be registered (1995 KCC art. 317).
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CorporateSpinoffs

In conjunction with the new mergers regulations, for the first
time corporations can spin off divisions into other corporations.
An entire section devoted to corporate spinoffs was added to the
1998 amendments of the KCC under Section 11 immediately following the new section on mergers."' These spinoff procedures
offer another means to assist companies in their restructuring efforts. In particular, larger companies that needed to specialize
their operations or that wanted to shed corporate divisions welcomed the new procedures. 4
The new section on spinoffs broadly divides spinoffs into
"Standard Spinoffs" and "Spinoff Mergers." 46 A Standard Spinoff
involves a single company dividing into several different companies. Spinoff Mergers proceed one step further, occurring when a
single company divides into several different companies and then
one or more of these new companies simultaneously merge into
other preexisting companies. Short-form spinoff mergers and
small-scale spinoff mergers are also possible. 4 In either case, the
original company may or may not continue to exist, and only
stock corporations can engage in spinoffs."4
Numerous restrictions have been established to protect interested parties such as shareholders and creditors during the spinoff
process. First, shareholders must approve spinoffs with the same
special majority vote required for mergers.'
Shareholders who
object to Spinoff Mergers can furthermore request appraisal
rights15 While dissenting shareholders of Standard Spinoffs do
not have appraisal rights, a provision provides that if the "burden
of the shareholders" increases as a result of a Standard Spinoff or
Spinoff Merger, then approval from all the shareholders is re144
145

See 1998 KCC sec. 11.
See Bok-ki Hong, Sang-bp-ae it-suh-suh Hwoe-sa-ui boon-hal-aegwan-han

gyu-jung-ui do-ip-gum-to [Consideringthe Adoption of Regulations on Corporate
Spinoffs in the Commercial Code], 17 COM. L. REv. 343 (1998); CHAN-Soo
SHIN ET AL., KOREA LISTED Co. ASS'N, HWoE-SA-BooN-HAL-Ui JAE-DO-WHAAE GWAN-HAN YON-GOO [RESEARCH STUDY ON THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SPINOFFS] (Dec. 1995).
146 1998 KCC art. 530-2.
147
148

149
151

See 1999 KCC art. 530-11.
See 1998 KCC art. 5304.
See id.
art. 530-3.
See id. arts. 530-11, 522-3.
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quired."'5 Creditors also have considerable rights because they
can block companies
from engaging in Standard Spinoffs or
15 2
Mergers.
Spinoff
Companies that remain in existence after a spinoff or companies established as a result of a spinoff are jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company from which they originated."5 3 This obligation was created to deter firms from abusing
the spinoff procedure. Otherwise, abusive dominant shareholders
could, for instance, siphon assets to a spinoff company and leave
the original company as a shell with all the liabilities.
In a Standard Spinoff, if shareholders of the original company
approve of the spinoff by a special majority vote, the liabilities of
the newly established spinoff company could be limited to the
amount that the original firm invests into it.154 Similarly, for
Spinoff Mergers, the liability could be limited to the amount that
the original firm invests into the preexisting company that merges
with the spinoff. In both Standard Spinoffs and Spinoff Mergers,
if the original company continues to exist after the spinoff, then it
will only be responsible for the liability not assumed by the new
spinoff. Hanwha Living and Creative Corporation became the
first spinoff of a listed company on July 1, 1999, when it divided
into two companies.'
3.6.

The Expansion ofAppraisalRights

Dissenting shareholders can now claim appraisal rights under
a variety of new circumstances."5 6 The KCC provides that appraisal rights will be offered to shareholders in the following
situations: (1) if a shareholder disagrees with a merger proposal
or a significant sale or purchase of business operations; (2) if a

151
152

Id. art. 530-3.
See id.arts. 530-9, 530-11.

153

See id.art. 530-9.

154 See id.

"' See Yoon-jae Han, Gook-nae sang-jang-sa chut gi.up.boon-hal[First Corporate Spinoff of a Domestic Listed Company], CHOSUN ILBO, May 7, 1999;
Young-sul Kwon, Han-wha-jong-hap-hwa-hak, 2 dae-sa.ro bool.li... ga-gong/
won-ryo boo-moon [Hanwha Living and Creative CorporationDivided into Tvo
Companies... Processing/RawMaterials Division],KOREA ECON. DAILY, May
3, 1999.
156 Appraisal rights used to be limited to publicly listed companies. See
SEA art. 191.
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shareholder disagrees with a spinoff
merger; or (3) if a share157
denied.
is
shares
of
transfer
holder's
In the first two cases, where a shareholder disagrees with a
merger or a significant sale or purchase of business operations, or
with a spinoff merger, that shareholder can request appraisal
rights. Shareholders must notify the company of their objection
before the relevant shareholders' meeting and then request appraisal rights within twenty days after the shareholders' meeting."58 The company must then purchase the shareholder's stock
within two months of this request.
In the case of restricted shares, shareholders must first notify
the board of directors in writing of their intention to sell their
shares to a certain person.5 9 The board of directors must notify
the shareholders within one month after receiving this notice as
to whether they approve the transfer."6 If the board rejects the
transfer, then the shareholders may ask that the company designate an appropriate recipient to purchase the shares or may demand appraisal rights.'61
In any case, when a company repurchases a shareholder's
stock based on appraisal rights, the price is determined by consensus between the shareholder and the company. 62 If they cannot
agree to a price, an accounting expert or a court is supposed to determine the price. If more than thirty percent of the dissenting
shareholders disagree with the price decided by the accounting
expert, 3 they can request that a court decide the appropriate
16
price.
After the price is determined and the stock is repurchased, the
company must eventually dispose of the stock in due time.' If
See 1995 KCC arts. 335-2, 335-6 (transfer restrictions), art. 374-2 (significant sale or purchase of business operations), art. 522-3 (mergers), and art.53011 (spinoff mergers). Article 374-2 specifically applies to: (1 the sale of a
117

company's entire business operations or a significant portion of it; (2) the execution, change, or termination of a leasing, management transfer, profit-loss
sharing, or similar agreement involving a company's entire business operations;
or (3)the purchase of another company's entire business operations.
...See 1995 KCC art. 374-2.
159 See id. art. 335-2, para. 1.
160 See id. para. 2.
161 See id. para. 4.
162

See 1995 KCC art. 335-5.

161 See id. art. 374-2, para. 4.
164

See id. art. 341-2, para. 3.
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several dissenting shareholders exist, one question that arises is
whether the company must repurchase the various shares at the
same price. The explanatory background of 1998 KCC, while
not authoritative, suggests that the repurchase can be at the same
price if the individual shareholders agree with the company.16
3.7.

PreferredStock

A notable goal of the new KCC is to revitalize the largely defunct preferred stock market in Korea. First issued in 1986 by the
Oriental Brewery Company, preferred stock has been considered
a failure in Korea. 166 Prices of preferred stock have continued to
hover at discounts of over fifty percent of the
16 7 price of common
stock, reflecting the lack of investor interest.
The collapse of the price of preferred shares in Korea can be
attributed to the fact that they have not offered any tangible
benefits, especially when compared to common stock. Without
exception, shares of preferred stock in Korea have been nonvoting and dividend-giving.1 6' The voting rights of preferred stock
were usually cancelled in return for a "preferred" dividend. 6
The problem was that the preferred dividends were too meager to
offset the loss of the voting rights. With the increasing importance of the mergers and acquisitions market, preferred stock
without voting rights in particular became increasingly unpopular. 170
Preferred stock dividends were determined by merely adding
one percent to the dividends given to common stock.17 ' This
simplistic method of calculation was used because Article 344 of
the previous Commercial Code only provided that dividends had
"' See ExplanatoryNotes, supranote 83, at 122.
166 See Chan-hyung Chung, Woo.sun-joo [Preferred Stock], GO-SHI-GYE,
Mar. 1995, at 29.

117The discount rate has been increasing recently with the advent of new
preferred stock. See Analysis of Listing and Current Market Price of Preferred
Stock, Public Disclosure Department, KSE Press Release, at 6-7 (July 30, 1999)
(on file with author).
168 See Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 166. Preferred stock has also been
nonparticating and noncumulative for dividend payments, and preferred stock
that provides stock dividends or preferred distribution in the case of dissolution has not existed. See id.
169

KCC arts. 344, 370.

17

See Chan-hyung Chung, supra note 166.

171

See id.
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to be "preferred" to the amount of dividends awarded to common stock, without any further explanation as to what "preferred" meant. Dividends for common stock were already at a
low level and typically awarded based on par value." Therefore,
in determining the preferred dividend, one percent of the minimum 5000 won (U.S. $4.17) par value of stock, or fifty won (U.S.
$0.04), was added to whatever dividends common stockholders

received."
To enhance the appeal of preferred stock, instead of paying a
preferred stock dividend that merely fluctuated according to the
dividends given to common stock, companies must now set in
their articles of incorporation a minimum dividend that will be
granted to preferred stockholders. 4 This stipulation adds predictability and encourages higher dividends. As a result, most
companies have fixed their minimum preferred stock dividends at
nine percent of the 5000 won par value, which equals 450 won
(U.S. $0.38).'7 s Preferred stock that provides stock dividends or
preferred distribution in the case of dissolution does not have to
follow this minimum requirement. 17 This new minimum requirement does not apply retroactively and only applies to preferred stock issued after October 1, 1996. l77
Finally, to encourage the issuance of preferred stocks that
award their dividends in the form of stock instead of cash, stock
dividends can now be paid as any type of stock.7 This means
See infra Section 3.8 for a further description of the generally low dividend policy.
" See Bup-jae hyun-an [Current Legislative Issues], National Assembly Samoo-chuh, 95-15, at 8-9 (Oct. 24, 1995).
174 See 1995 KCC art. 344. In February 1997, the Korea GreenCross Corporation was the first company to issue preferred stock with a minimum dividend. See Seung-il Hong, Choe-jub-bae-dang-ryul bo-jang joo-shik deung-jang
[Minimum Dividend Guaranteed Stock Appear], JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 19,
1997.
17s Forty-five percent of preferred stocks listed under the new regulations
have set their minimum dividend at nine percent. See Jeong Hwan Wui, Shinhyung woo-sun-joo bal-haenggae-hwoek sang-jang-hwoe-sajun-chae-uijul-ban [Half
ofListed Companies Plan to Issue New PreTerredShares], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar.
27, 1997.
176 See 1998 KCC art. 344.
177 Article 4 of the Addendum to the 1995 KCC states that the provisions
of Article 344 will only apply to preferred stocks issued after October 1, 1996,
and will not apply retroactively to previously issued stock.
17

178 See 1995 KCC art. 462-2, para. 1.
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preferred stockholders can conceivably receive stock dividends in
either preferred stock or even common stock.179

3.8.

Dividends

As mentioned earlier, a critical problem has been that dividends for common stock have been woefully inadequate."s' In
1997, for instance, the average dividend yield in Korea was 3.22%.
From 1994 to 1998, companies averaged between 403 won (U.S.

$0.36) and 475 won (U.S. $0.40) in dividends per share."' Companies declared only the bare minimum dividend needed to meet
the listing requirements or regulatory standards.8 2
Without sufficient dividend income, the investment goals for

investors naturally shifted to short-term speculative trading instead of long-term capital gains.8 3 In a vicious circle, short-term
investors would not persevere in monitoring or pressuring man-

agement for higher dividends, management would not feel obligated to declare more dividends than necessary, and, with low
dividends, shareholders would lose their incentive for long-term
investment.
The 1995 KCC introduced a variety of incentives in an attempt to boost dividends, especially stock dividends. First, as
179 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 168-69.
One question that remains is whether shareholders of previously issued preferred stock who receive
newly issued stock should receive preferred stock according to the new rules
that stipulate the minimum preferred dividend or according to the old rules
that do not. According to an advisory opinion issued by the Korean Securities
Supervisory Board, "old preferred stock" should continue to receive the same
type of old preferred stock when receiving new issuances. See Moo-sang.jeung.Ia
woo-sun-joo-bae-jung 'non-Ian' ['Dispute' over Distribution of Preferred Stock],
KOREA ECON. DAILY, Sept. 26, 1996. In April 1998, the Stock Supervisory
Board was merged into the Financial Supervisory Service. See Financial Supervisory Commission (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.fsc.go.kr>.
180 See Jae-oh Yoon, 01 joo-chong bae-dang yang-geuk-hwa ddoo.yut
[Amount ofDividends Declaredat This Year's Shareholders' Meetings Clearly Di.
verge], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999.
181 See KOREA LISTED CO. A5S'N, 12 WOL GYUL-SAN SANG-JANG-HWOE-SA
1998 GYUL-SAN-SHIL-JUK MIT JAE-MOO-BOON-SUK [1998 ACCOUNT STATISTICS

AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF DECEMBER ACCOUNT LISTED COMPANIES]

16

(Apr. 1999) (on file with author).
"82 To be listed on the First Section [Jae-l-bu] of the KSE, a company with
a par value of 5000 won must issue at least a 300 won dividend. If a company
does not issue dividends in two of the past three years, it will drop to the Second Section [Jae-2.bu]. See KSE, Yu.ga-jeung-kwon-sang-jang-gyu-jung [Regula.
tions on Listing Securities] arts. 31.3, 32.5.
183 See KSE Press Release, supra note 37.
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mentioned previously, companies may now award stock dividends in any type of stock they wish.'84 This additional potential
enhances the options, and hence the attractiveness, of stocks.
Second, a new calculation method has been developed for stock
dividends. When the stock dividend to be awarded is less than
one share and amounts only to fractional shares, companies may
combine those fractional shares and either auction them or sell
the stock on the stock market and then return the monetary proceeds as dividends to the shareholder. 8 ' In the past, the KCC did
not provide for methods of calculating fractional shares. 8'
Even more significantly, under the 1998 KCC, directors can
declare cash dividends within a given year on a one-time basis.
This option must be provided for in the company's articles of incorporation."" Directors, however, must be careful when declaring interim dividends. If they declare interim dividends when the
company lacks sufficient net assets on its balance sheet, the directors will be held jointly and severally liable for the difference. 8
Directors can only avoid this type of liability if they demonstrate
that they have met their duty of care. 8 9 According to the Korea
Stock Exchange, of the 516 listed companies with fiscal years ending in December 1998, forty-one have included a provision in
their articles of incorporation that allows for interim dividends. 19"
Finally, companies must award dividends within one month
after the shareholders' meeting at which the dividends were approved, unless shareholders have decided otherwise.' 9' The time
period was shortened from two months because companies would
consistently force shareholders to wait the full two-month period."
1995 KCC art. 462-2.
185 See id.
186 See ExplanatoryNotes, supra note 83, at 168-69.
187 See 1998 KCC arts. 462-3.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See Sung-won Lee, Dae-duk-san-updeung 22 sa aek-myun boon-hal: 12 wol
bup-in jung-gwan byun-gyung [December Accounting Year Companies Make
Changes in Articles f Incorporation:Daeduk Industries and 22 Other Companies
ProvideforStock Splits], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 30, 1999.
191 See 1998 KCC art. 344 and 1998 KCC art. 464-2. Interim dividends
must be awarded one month after they are declared by the board of directors.
184

See 1998 KCC art. 464-2.
192

See Explanatory Notes, supra note 83, at 173.
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CapitalAccumulation, Par Value, Stock Splits, and Stock

Options
Companies can raise capital more efficiently under the various
revisions to the KCC. After incorporating, companies can set the
amount of authorized stock according to their needs. In earlier
KCC versions, firms could not increase their authorized stock
more than four times the previous amount.193 Every time this
relative limit was reached, companies had to call a shareholders'
meeting to increase the authorized stock by amending the articles
of incorporation. The revision seeks to make it less cumbersome
for firms to attract capital.194
The restrictions governing the issuance of bonds have also
been eased. Under the revised Article 470, companies can issue
bonds up to four times the amount of assets provided on their
balance sheet from the previous accounting year.19 Previously,
companies were limited to twice the sum of their stated capital
and reserves or, if total assets were less than this sum, twice their
total assets.9
The 1995 KCC allows holders of convertible bonds or bonds
with warrants to convert their bonds even when the shareholder
list has been closed for recording purposes prior to the shareholders' meeting.'
This makes bonds more attractive by giving
bondholders added liquidity. Bonds converted to stock can not
be used to participate at the shareholders' meeting for which the
shareholder list has been closed.'
The 1998 KCC aims to increase corporate liquidity and allow
companies to raise capital more easily in other ways. First, the
minimum par value of stocks has been dramatically lowered from
5000 won (U.S. $4.17) to 100 won (U.S. $0.08).199 While Korea
still does not allow non-par value stock, lowering the minimum

193 See 1995 KCC art. 437, limiting the amount of authorized stock. This
section was repealed in 1995.
194

See ExplanatoryNotes, supra note 83, at 156-57.

195 See 1995
196 See id.

KCC art. 470.

197 See id.arts. 516, 516-10.
191 See id arts. 350, 516, 516-9.

See 1998 KCC art. 329. But see Ki-won Choi, supra note 35 (arguing
that the par value should not have been lowered below the 1962 requirement
of 500 won (U.S. $0.41)).
199
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par value helps entities, such as venture companies, to raise capital
more effectively.
Korean corporations can now execute stock splits.2 "' Stock
splits require a special majority shareholder vote and must follow
the same procedures used for stock mergers.20 ' In conjunction
with the lower minimum par value, stock splits have become easier to achieve. They enhance liquidity and allow stock prices to
be adjusted to make mergers and acquisitions more attractive.
Stock splits are increasingly gaining in popularity: of the 516
listed companies with fiscal years ending in December 1998,
twenty-two companies decided to carry out stock splits, resulting
in lower par values. 2
Finally, unlisted companies can issue stock options in the
same manner as listed companies. 3 Companies can issue stock
options at a predetermined rate to directors, auditors and employees after a special majority vote. Shareholders who have
more than ten percent of the issued shares, those who have "actual influence" in the election or termination of directors or auditors, or direct relatives of any of these persons, are specifically ineligible to receive stock options. The total amount of stock
options cannot exceed ten percent of the total number of issued
shares. Persons with stock options can exercise them after holding their position for at least two years after the special majority
shareholder vote to issue the stock options. Stock options are not
transferable, but may be inherited.
4. THE CHANGING CORPORATE LANDSCAPE

The recent amendments to the KCC have helped reshape Korea's corporate environment. The most visible developments affect corporate governance. A host of practically defunct, but
critical, legal provisions in the KCC were used for the first time.
For example, the lower shareholder holding requirements have
helped once passive shareholders, particularly those with nonprincipal interests, to assert their rights in an unprecedented fash200

See 1998 KCC art. 329-2.

201 See id. arts. 440 to 444.

202 See Bong-kwon Park, Aek-myon-boon-hal gi-up si-jan-soo.ik-ryul 3 bae i-

sang cho-gwa-soo-ik-ryul ol-lyuh [Companies that Split Stock Had Profit Yields
Three Times Greater Than that of Market Yields], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 24,
1999.
203 See 1999 KCC arts. 340-2 to 340-5, 341-2; SEA art. 189-4.
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ion.2 Shareholders have brought the first-ever derivative actions
against 2directors and have even made challenges for corporate
control. 11
Although not yet numerous, hostile takeover bids have been
attempted and target companies have learned to employ various
types of defensive tactics. 6 The first successful hostile takeover
under the SEA is considered to be Savoy Hotel's acquisition of
Shinsung Trading."
A confluence of other factors has increased the effectiveness of
the changes to the KCC. Upon realizing that they have rights,
shareholders are becoming more active participants in corporate
affairs. 08 Investors are challenging management regarding decisions, performance, and misconduct. 2 Foreign investors are also
204 See Mark L. Clifford, The Stars of Asia, BUS. WK. INT'L EDITION, June
29, 1998, at 70; Jon E. Hilsenrath & Namju Cho, Shareholders Begin to Show
Muscle in Korea, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1998, at 1; Moon Ihlwan, The
ShareholderRevolt Comes to Korea, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 52; Michael
Lewis, The World's Biggest Going-out-ofBusiness Sale, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May
31, 1998, at 34, 53; Sandra Sugawara, South Korea Takes on Family Business
Groups, WASH. POST., Mar. 11, 1999, at E2; Jennifer Veale, This Time Around,
Goliath May Strike Back, BUS. WK. INT'L EDITION, Mar. 29, 1999, at 26;
George Wehrfritz, A Revolution in the Boardrooms,NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1998,
at 14-17. The minority shareholder movement in Korea has been largely
sp earheaded by the Participatory Economic Committee ("PEC") of the People s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy ("PSPD"), a public interest group.
See ParticipatoryEconomic Committee (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http://ww.
pspd.org/pec>.
205 See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
first derivative action.
206 Some recent target companies where management control was challenged include Caproraktam, Hangdo Merchant Bank, Ulsan Merchant Bank

and Midopa. See Byung-gi Hong, Caproraktamjoo-chong-suh ddo kyuk-dol [Another Collision at Caproraktam'sShareholders' Meeting], JOONGANG ILBO, Feb.
28, 1996; Byung-il Yeh, Hang-do-jong-geum ]i-]oo-hwoe-sa gong-bang [Hangdo
MerchantBank Having Holding Company Debate], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 4, 1997;
Byung-il Yeh, Mi-do-pa M&A boon-jaeng bon-gyuk-hwa [Midopa M&A Dispute
Begins in Earnest], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 25, 1997; Byung-il Yeh, Ul-san-jong-

geum-do M&A bi-sang [Ulsan Merchant Bank also Faces an M&A Emergency],
CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 11, 1996.
20 See Hun-soo Kim, Shin-sung-moo-yuk M&A ma-moo-ri [M&A of Shinsung
Trading Completed], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Nov. 27, 1997; Byung-il Yeh, Savoy

Hotel Shin-sung-moo-yok in-soo [Savoy Hotel Acquires Shinsung Trading],
CHOSUN ILBO, Aug. 1, 1997.
208 See Hong-ryul Chun, supra note 110, at 77.
209 See Hae-won Choi, In Seoul: South Korean Companies Bend to Assuage
Activists, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1999, at 13; Sung-il Hong,Joo-jooja-bonjoo-ui shi-hum moo-dae [Shareholder Capitalism Test Case], JOONGANG ILBO,
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assuming a more demanding presence, acquiring companies, and
questioning management. 21' The urgency of the financial crisis
forced companies to place an emphasis on shareholder value in
order to attract large-scale capital infusions and accept debt for
equity swaps. This led to a relinquishment or co-sharing of management control in many cases. Several notable examples will be
examined to illustrate how the new corporate regulations and the
new environment have affected corporate Korea.

4.1.

The Kickoff: DaehanPulp and OrientalBrewery

In October 1996, the first signs of a changing corporate environment emerged. On October 22, 1996, eighteen minority
shareholders of Daehan Pulp requested the convening of a special
shareholders' meeting to terminate the chairman of the board of
directors.2"' This request for a special shareholders' meeting was
considered the first case in which shareholders formally exercised
their shareholder rights since the enactment of the KCC in
1962.212 Shareholders sought to hold Daehan Pulp's management
accountable for losses they suffered when Daehan Pulp initially
disclosed and then withdrew its intentions to enter the telecommunications sector.
Management, in contrast, claimed they were victims of stock
manipulation and that the shareholder action itself was being led

Feb. 16, 1998, at 27; Charles Lee, FairerShares, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 1,
1999, at 56 (stating that "the chaebols have woken up to the potency of shareholder activism and have showed an uncharacteristic deference to it" and that
"Jang and his cohorts at the PSPD have unleashed seismic changes in Korean
corporate culture"); Jung-Jae Lee, So-aek-joojoo gwon-li-chat-gi gae-in-deul mok-

so-ri kuh-jyuh [As Minority Shareholders Claim Rights, Voices of Individuals Get
Larger],JOONGANG ILBO, Apr. 1, 1998.
211 See discussion infra Section 4.4.
211

See Young-soo Kim, Daehan Pulp/Too-ja-ja son-shil-ip-hin dae-pyo-i-sa

twoe-jin.yo-goo [Daehan Pulp: Demanding the Removal of the Representative Director that CausedLosses to Investors], CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 7, 1996, at 13; Sanghoon Song, So-soojo-joo joo-chong-so-jip yo-goo non-lan/Daehan Pulp [Debate
Over Minority Shareholders'Request to Convene a Shareholders'Meeting/Daehan
Pulp], JOONGANG ILBO, Nov. 7, 1996, at 31 [hereinafter Sang-hoon Song,De-

bate over Request].
212 See Dong-han Lee, Jip-joong boonsuk- So-aek-joo-joo woon-dong [Special
Focus: Minority Shareholder Movement], CHOSUN ILBO, Apr. 2, 1999, at 12;
Sang-hoon Song, Debate Over Request, supra note 211.
213 See Sang-hoon Song, Debate over Request, supra note 211.
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by manipulators.214 Eventually, before a court decision was
reached, this dispute was settled when the shareholders dropped
their request and reached an agreement with Daehan Pulp's management.2 15

This case nevertheless had significant precedential

value and opened a new dimension in relations between shareholders and management.
Shortly after the Daehan Pulp case, shareholders of the Oriental Brewery ("OB") company followed suit and in November
1996, exercised their shareholder rights. The OB case arose when
a subsidiary of OB sought to expand its market presence in certain regional markets and sell soju, a Korean liquor, directly in
competition with several local manufacturers.2 6
In response to this challenge, three local soju companies joined
forces and began acquiring shares in OB as a countermeasure. After acquiring a fifteen percent stake in OB, they then requested
the first-ever inspection of a company's corporate books." This
type of shareholder strategy was one of the first of its kind.
Given generally opaque Korean accounting practices, a request
for an inspection would be a considerable challenge to almost any
company because it could expose sensitive financial information
and accounting irregularities. OB countered that this inspection
request was an abuse of shareholder rights to intimidate it into
withdrawing from the regional soju markets.218
On January 24, 1997, the Seoul District Court issued an opinion approving the petition to inspect OB's books.219 This deci21 See Young-soo Kim, "Dae-han-pulp" bon-gyuk-dae-gyul dol.ip [Serious
ChallengeforDaehanPulpBegins], CHOSUN ILBo, Nov. 8, 1996.
21 See Jin-woo Lee, Daehan Pulp so-aek-joo-joo "joo-chong.so" chui-ha [Dae.
han Pulp Small Shareholders Withdraw Shareholders' Meeting Action], MAEIL
Bus. NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, at 21.
216 See Sang-hoon Song, "Gyung-wolji-bang.jin-chool' bup-jung-ssa.woom [Legal Battle over 'Gyungwol's Entry into Regional Market], JOONGANG ILBO,
Nov. 19, 1996 [hereinafter Sang-hoon Song,Legal Battle].
217 For another recent example of a court finding that shareholders have a
right to inspect a company's records provided they have a legitimate reason
and meet the relevant holding requirement, see Judgment Mar. 11, 1998, Seoul
Ji-bang-bup-won [District Court], Jae 19 Min-sa-bu [19th Civil Division], 97
Kahap 68790.
211 See Sang-hoon Song, Legal Battle, supra note 216.
219 See Sang-ryul Lee,Ji-bang-so.joo 3 gae-sa-ae OB jang-boo yol-lam huh.yong
[Three Local Soju CompaniesAllowed to Inspect OB's Books], JOONGANG ILBO,
Jan. 23, 1997, at 4; Myung-soo Suh, So-soo-joo-joo.deul kyung-young gam-shi
hwal-balyei-go [Many PredictMinority Shareholders WillActively Monitor CorporateManagement],JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 24, 1997, at 5; Jung-hwan Wui,So-joo-
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sion became the first case where a court formally recognized the
exercise of a shareholder's rights under the KCC.' The Court
held that the shareholders had met the necessary holding requirement and were therefore entitled to exercise their legally
guaranteed rights. Ultimately, the inspection was not carried out
because the parties reached a compromise. Nevertheless, both the
Daehan Pulp and OB cases were significant because they awakened shareholders and corporate Korea to the potential impact
and importance of shareholder rights."
4.2.

Challengesto CorporateControl: HanwhaMerchantBank
andMidopa DepartmentStore

In another notable episode in Korean corporate history, a
longstanding minority investor attempted to assume control of a
financial institution. This challenge was significant not only as
the first major takeover attempt in Korea, but furthermore because the target, Hanwha Merchant Bank ("HMB"), was a subsidiary of a chaebol conglomerate, the Hanwha Group.'m Ui-song
Park, the second largest shareholder, amassed a near dominant
forty percent of the outstanding shares of HMB, primarily
through his company, Woopoong Mutual Savings and Finance,
and another friendly partner.'
On December 6, 1996, Park anjoo, Sang-jang-sa jang-boo-yeol-lam chut huh-yong

[Minority ShareholdersAllowed

for the First Time to Inspect Corporate Books of a Listed Company], MAEIL BUS.
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1997.
220 See Jung-hwan Wui, supra note 219. In a subsequent opinion, the Seoul
High Court reversed a lower court decision and found that the company has

the burden to prove that a shareholder's request is unreasonable. See Myungjin Lee, [Bup-won] Gyung-mot ib-jeung mot-hae-do ju-ju jang-bu yol-lamgyon bo-jang, [Courts: Sharehoders Inspection Rights Guaranteed Even ifMismangement Not Proven], CHOSUN ILBo, Dec. 25, 1998. Gyo-chang Kim suggested earlier that companies should have the burden of proof. See Gyo-chang
Kim, Sang-bup-Joong hwoe-sa-pyun-ui gaejung-ui-gyun [Opinion on the Amendment of the Stock CorporationSection of the Korean Commercial Code], L. TIMES
(Seoul), Mar. 12, 1998, at 14.
21 See Joo-byung Park, So-soo-joojoo-deul gwon-li-haeng-sa neul-ub-nan-da
[More Cases of ShareholdersExercising Their Rights], KOREA ECON. DAiLY, Jan.
3, 1997.
22 See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik, Dae-gi-up sang-dae gook-nae chut

M&A [FirstDomestic M&A of a Large Conglomerate],JOONGANG ILBo, Dec. 7,
1996, at 1; Woopoong Mutual Secures 40% Stake in Unit of Hanwha, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at 3.
' See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik, supra note 222; Woopoong Mutual Secures 40% Stake in Unit ofHanwha, supra note 222.
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nounced that he had filed a petition with the Seoul District Court
requesting specific performance to convene a special shareholders'

meeting so 4that he could claim control of the management of the
company2

While corporate Korea looked on in great anticipation, on
January 7, 1997, the board of I-RIMB employed a surprising takeover defense. They nullified Park's efforts through a private

placement of forty billion won (U.S. $33.3 million) in convertible
bonds ("CB") to three friendly partners." s

The three pro-

management parties that acquired the convertible bonds then
immediately converted the bonds into stock. These white squires

gained seventeen percent of the total voting shares of HMB and
helped 6 management to successfully dilute shares favorable to

Park.2
Park, in turn, challenged management's takeover defense. He

attempted to enjoin the voting rights of the management-friendly
shareholders who purchased the convertible bonds.m He claimed
that the issuance of the convertible bonds by I-MB's management

to protect their control violated their fiduciary duty under the
KCC.28 Although sympathetic to Park's claim, the Seoul District
Court ultimately rejected Park's arguments.2 9 The District
Court stated that, despite the interests of shareholders, the voting

rights stemming from the convertible bonds could not be cancelled at that stage because the instruments had been already is-

4 See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik, supra note 222.
The three friendly partners were Samshin-Allstate, HiFive, and
Donghung Electric. See Myung-soo Suh, Han-wha-jong.geum sa-mo-sa-chaejun.
kyuk bal.haeng [Hanwha Merchant Bank Issues Private Placement of CBs],
JOONGANG ILBO,Jan. 9, 1997, at 3.
26 See Myung-soo Suh, Han-wha-jong-geum sa-mo CB chutjoo-shikjun.hwan
[HanwhaMerchant Bank PrivatelyPlced-CB Converted into Stock], JOONGANG
ILBO, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1.
227 See KCC art. 424.
2"8 See Byung-il Yeh, Han-whajong.geum: Gyung-young-gwon hyang-bang
bup-won-su pan-ga-reum-nal-dut [Hanwha Merchant Bank- Appears the Future of
Management Control Will Be Decided by the Courts], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 9,
1997. Fourteen minority shareholders also brought suit against the issuance of
the convertible bonds. Han-wha-jong-geum so-aek-joo-joo so-song [Minority
ShareholdersofHanwhaMerchant Sue], JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 11, 1997, at 1.
229 See Judgment of Feb. 6, 1997, Seoul Chi-bang-bup-won [District Court],
Jae 50 Min-sa-bu [50th Civil Division], 97 Kkahap 118; see also Byung-il Yeh,
Han-whajong-geum in-soo shi-do moo-san [Hanwha Merchant Bank Takeover At.
tempt Thwarted, CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 7, 1997, at 9.
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sued and converted into stock.Y The court was concerned that
denying the voting rights of the stock would undermine the
"safety of the market.""' With their additional voting power secured, Hanwha narrowly defeated Park's takeover attempts at the
special shareholders' meeting held on February 13, 1997. z 2
This district court ruling was problematic for a number of
reasons. The converted stocks in question had yet to be listed;
furthermore, the original purchasers still held the converted
stocks. Therefore, it is not clear why there would have been any
serious market disruption if their voting rights were denied. On
appeal, Park requested an injunction to cancel the convertible
bonds. 3 The Seoul High Court, in turn, agreed that the issuance
of the convertible bonds should be cancelled because they infringed on the rights of shareholders." The court cited that the
primary purpose of the issuance of the bonds was to defend management's control." s However, the High Court ultimately deferred judgment on whether the voting rights should be denied.
During this dramatic series of events, several rarely-employed
provisions of the KCC were once again used. Park's request for a
special shareholders' meeting, for instance, was considered to be
only the second case, after Daehan Pulp, of a shareholder in Korea bringing such a request." Next, as with the OB case, Park
asked for an inspection of the corporate books." Third, the special shareholders' meeting that was held produced the first-ever

230

See Judgment of Feb. 6, 1997, supra note 229.

231
2

Id.

23'

See id.

See Sang-hoon Song, Han-wha "Jong-geum gyung-young-gwon" bang-uh
[Hanwha Defends ChallengeAgainst 'MerchantBank Management'I,JOONGANG
ILBo, Feb. 14, 1997, at 26.
" See Judgment of May 13, 1997, Seoul Go-deung-bup-won [High Court],
97 Ra 36; Judgment of Feb. 6, 1997, Jae 50 Min-sa-bu [50th Civil Division], 97
Kahap 118.

See id.
236 KCC art. 366.
235

17

See Sang-hoon Song & Shin-sung Shik,supra note 222.
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proxy fight in Korea."8 This battle for control eventually became
moot when -MB was declared insolvent. 9
At about the same time as the 1-IMB case, another major hostile takeover attempt occurred. On January 23, 1997, Dongbang
Peregrine Securities announced that it wished to elect a new management for Midopa Department Store.24 Midopa was the flagship company of the thirty-fourth largest conglomerate in Korea,
the Dainong Group. Dongbang Peregrine claimed that Midopa
could be managed more effectively.241 Not only did this case involve another challenge against a chaebol company, but it was also
a hostile takeover attempt that was launched by an entirely outside conglomerate.
Following the Hanwha experience and other recent examples,
several provisions of the KCC were utilized again. First, Dongbang Peregrine declared its interest in inspecting Midopa's corpo-

238 See KCC art. 368; see also Byung-il Yeh, Hanwha.Park Ui-song: Hanwha-jong-geum wui-im-jang]eng-tal-un, CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 30, 1999. The first
proxy solicitation initiated by a foreign shareholder occurred in March 1998
against SK Telecom. See infra notes 268-70 and accompany text for a detailed
discussion of the SK Telecom proxy solicitation.
' See In-soo Kim, Woe-hwan-wui-gi Joo-bum boo-shil-jong-geum.sa pa-sanchuh-ri-do him-deul-uh [It's Also Difficut to Liquidate the Main Culprits of the
Foreign Currency Crisis, the Improperly Run Merchant Banks], MAEIL BUS.

NEWS, Oct. 22, 1998.

240 See Byung-il Yeh, Mi-do-pa-joo-cbong-suh ui-gyul.gwon haeng-sa [Exercising ShareholderRights at the Midopa Shareholders'Meeting], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan.
24, 1997.
241 See id. Some reports claimed that Dongbang Peregrine was merely
greenmailing Midopa on behalf of unknown foreign investors that reportedly
held up to 20% of Midopa's shares. See Young-shin Yoon, Hongkong Money:
gook-nae joong-gyun-gi-up-joo jip-joong-mae-jip [Hong Kong Money: Concentrate
Purchases a/ Stock ofMiddle Size Domestic Companies], CHOSUN ILBo, Feb. 7,
1997. The Securities Supervisory Board censured Dongbang.Peregrine for"illegal parking," (i.e., using a third party to acquire Midopa shares to avoid disclosure requirements), which was considered one of the first such cases ever.
See Byung-il Yeh, Bool-bup Parking'haeng-wui gi-seung [llegal 'Parking'Practice
Flourishes],CHOSUN ILBO, July 9, 1997, at 12. Ultimately, Shindongbang, the
joint venture partner of Peregrine that established Dongbang-Peregrine, later
emerged as the real suitor seeking to take control of Midopa. See Byung-il Yeh,
Shin-dong-bang Group: Mi-do-pa-loo mae-jip hwak-in [Shindongbang Group Confirms It PurchasedMi'dopa Shares], CHOSUN ILBO, Mar. 5, 1997. See generally
Seong C. Gweon, Play a Fair Game, Please, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 12, 1997
(discussing the various financial regulations breached during the deal).
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rate books.24 2 Second, Shindongbang requested a special shareholders' meeting to elect new management.243
Midopa, in the meantime, followed HMB's strategy and issued
a private placement of fifty billion won (U.S. $41.7 million)
worth of convertible bonds and, later, bonds with warrants.2 In
this case, however, the Seoul District Court issued an injunction
preventing Midopa from offering the convertible bonds or the
bonds with warrants.
The court found that the Midopa case
differed from the Hanwha case because the injunction was requested before the bonds were issued and therefore a compelling
public interest to protect the market did not exist.246
While Midopa tried to defend itself, another unheard of event
occurred. One of Korea's three major investment trusts, Korea
Investment Trust Company ("KITC"), initially opposed Midopa's attempt to issue the privately placed convertible bonds.
KITC threatened that if Midopa issued the convertible bonds, in
the "interest of minority shareholders and institutional shareholders," it would transfer its 7.7% share of Midopa stock to the
party threatening the takeover.

This marked a rare occurrence

of an institutional investor publicly acting on behalf of the interests of its customers against actions taken by a company in which
242 See Byung-il Yeh, "Mi-do-pa M&A pa-moon" joo-yok Paul Pheby, jeunggwon-jun-moon-ga-in-ga gyo-ran-ja-in-ga [Paul Pheby, the Main Actor oJ the "Repercussions of the Midopa M&A": Is He a Securities Specialist or a Market Disrupter], CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 2, 1997.
243 See Myung-soo Sub, Shin-dong-bang, Mi-do- a-jang-ak jun-myun-gong-sae

[Shindongbang Frontal Offense to Take Control of Midopa], JOONGANG ILBO,

Mar. 13, 1997. Although Midopa was able to withstand Slindongbang's challenge, in the end the entire Dainong Group and Midopa collapsed argely from
the strain of defending the takeover. See Midopa Is Declared Bankrupt After
Loan Woes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1998, at 4.
244 Midopa also attempted to issue privately placed bonds with warrants.
See Sang-hoon Song, Midopa BW bal-haenggye-hwoek moo-san [Midopa's Plans to
Issue BWs Stopped], JOONGANG ILBO, Feb. 28, 1997, at 8.
245 The bonds would have been convertible before July 1, 1997. Judgment
of Feb. 27, 1997, Seoul Ji-bang-bup-won [District Court], Jae 50 Min-sa-bu
[50th Civil Division], 97 Kkahap 481. See Midopa Issues Bonds in Defensive
Move, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1997, at 13 [hereinafterDefensiveMove].
246 Midopa later issued the bonds by changing the terms so that shares
could be converted after July 1, 1997, which would prevent them from being
exercised at Midopa's annual shareholders' meeting in the fall. See Defensive
Move, supra note 245.
247 Mi-do-pa sa-mo CB bal-haeng ban-dae [Korea Investment Trust Objects to
Midopa'sPrivatePlacement of CBs], CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1.
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they invested. In Korea, fund managers have tended to be passive
and restrained.248
Overall, several aspects of the HMB and Midopa cases are
noteworthy. First, both cases demonstrated the enormous possibilities and the importance of shareholder rights.249 Second, they
exposed the vulnerability of corporate control in Korean companies and demonstrated that even firms within chaebol conglomerates were not immune from challenges. Although companies can
no longer issue private placements of bond offerings when facing
hostile threats, the defensive responses by Midopa, and previously
Hanwha, demonstrated the seriousness and urgency of their concerns. 211 In the aftermath of the Hanwha and Midopa incidents,
sixty-eight companies issued such private placements of convertible bonds primarily to secure management control."' Although
248 See Byung-il Yeh, Gi-gwan-too-ja-ga-deulbyun-shin [InstitutionalInvestors
Are Changing],CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 1, 1997, at 8.
249 At one point there was speculation that the Shindongbang Group
might try to take over not only Midopa, but also the entire Dainong Group.
See Sang-hoon Song, Dai-nong num.bo-gi.. . group M&A ga-neung-sung [Interest
in Dainon... Possibility of a Group M&A], JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 6, 1997.
Another bizarre event indicative of the collusive ties between many chaebol
conglomerates was that the Federation of Korean Industries, composed of the
nation's top chaebols, declared that it would join forces together to defend the
takeover of Midopa. This hasty solution was quickly withdrawn afterpressure
from the Korean Fair Trade Commission. See Namju Cho, Korea Takes New
Step, supra note 48; In-bae Seung,Jae-gye 'uk-dae-juk M&A gong-dong.dae-eung
[Industry Declares that It Will '7ointly Defend Hostile Takeovers1,CHOSUN
ILBO, Mar. 12, 1997, at 11; Kyung-m'n Chung, M&A gong-dong-dae.eung mothan-da [Joint Defense ofM&A Cannot Occur],JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 14, 1997;
Jn-bae Seung, Jae-gye 7uk-dae-juk M&A gong-dong-dae-eung [Industry Declares
that It Will 'Jointly Defend Hostile Takeovers'].
2"0

See SEA art. 24, SEA Implementing Decree arts. 10, 12-5; see also Sang-

ryul Lee, -yung-young-gwon boon-jaeng-joong-in gi-up: sa-mo-jun-hwan-sa-chae
bal-haeng-geum-ji 1 nyun-gan ]oo-shik-jun-hwan.do bool-huh [Companies Whose
Management Control is in Dispute Prohibitedfrom Private Placement of Con.
vertibe Bonds and Bonds Cannot Be Converted into Stock for One Year],
JOONGANG ILBO, Mar. 20, 1997.
251 See Tae-ung Chung, Sa-mo-jun-hwan-sa.chae bup-won-pan.kyul.ro M&A
tae-ma ban-kam dwoel-deut [The JudicialDecision on PrivatelyPlaced Convertible
Bonds Likely to Thwart M&A], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Feb. 9, 1997, at 4; Korean
Firms Issued $1.36 Billion of Convertible Bonds in Quarter,ASIAN WALL ST. J,
Apr. 3, 1997, at 20; Myung-soo Suh, Sa-mo-sa-chaejoo-sbik keun pok ha-rak [Privately Placed CB Stocks Drop by Big Margins],JOONGANG ILBO, Feb. 7, 1997, at
3; see also Kil-yong Ahn, Sa-mo-sa-cbae-ui moon- 'ae-jum gum-to mit dae-chek [Reviewing the Problemsand Solutionsfor PrivatePlacement Bonds], 37SANG-JANGHYUP 119, 130 (1998) (describing how companies have used private placement
of bonds to protect their management control in recent years).
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unsuccessful, these two cases were nevertheless the first serious
hostile takeover attempts to occur in Korean corporate history.
4.3.

Seeking ManagementAccountability: Korea FirstBank

In terms of capturing the attention of Korean management,
perhaps no event had a greater impact than the case of Korea First
Bank ("KFB"), once one of Korea's premier banks. As the primary lending bank to a string of failed chaebols that collapsed in
spectacular fashion, including the Hanbo Group, Kia Group, and
Sammi Group, the government was forced to nationalize KFB in
February 1998.252 KFB's troubles exemplified the ineffective corporate governance of financial intermediaries in Korea. Unchecked by shareholders, Korean banks were always highly susceptible to outside pressures.
First, KFB management faced tough questions from organized
shareholders regarding their roles in the Hanbo Group scandal
during the annual shareholders' meeting held in March 1997.
This marked one of the first times that minority shareholders systematically and vocally challenged a major corporation's management at a shareholders' meeting.253 Their most fundamental
rights of participation and voting were exercised. KFB management crudely tried to prevent shareholders from participating in
the annual shareholders' meeting and then managed to summarily
steamroll through various management proposals. However, minority shareholders later brought legal actions challenging the
procedural breaches, irregularities, and validity of the resolutions
made at this annual shareholders' meeting.
Two significant court decisions emerged from the events surrounding the failure of KFB. First, in a critical case, the Seoul
District Court held that the resolutions of the annual sharehold25 See Michael Schuman, Korea Watches, Waits as Sammi Group Seeks Court
Protectionfrom Creditors,AsIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 1.
" See Myung-jae Lee, Jae-il-eun joo-chong. . . sung-nan so-aek-joo-joo-deul
[KFB Shareholders' Meeting ... Angry Minority Shareholders], DONGA ILBO
(Seoul), Mar. 8, 1997, at 37. Minority shareholders also raised serious challenges at KFB's 1998 and 1999 shareholders' meetings. See Tae-ung Chung &
Hong-yul Kim, Eun-heng sal-ja-go so-aek-joo-joo da jook-ih-na [SacrificingAll the
Minority Shareholders to Save the Bank], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Mar. 3, 1999;
Hong-id Kim & Byung-il Yeh, Boo-shil-chek-im chu-goong-jung-chek-bi-pan 'botmooP: eun-haeng-joo-chong "dae-byun-hwa' [Wood' of Questioning Responsibility
for Mismanagement and CriticizingPolicies: 'Great Change' in Bank Shareholders'
Meetings], CHOSUN ILBO, Feb. 28, 1998, at 9.
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ers' meeting should be cancelled because of the various procedural
errors that occurred. They specifically cited the failure to give
objecting shareholders a chance to express their views." 4

The

Court stated that its decision disregarded how companies may
have conducted shareholders' meetings in the past. For the first
time, a court accepted a minority shareholder's petition255to cancel

resolutions that were passed at a shareholders' meeting.

Next, furious KFB stockholders initiated the first-ever share-

holder derivative action in Korea. 6 Shareholders claimed that
over 1.1 trillion won (U.S. $916.6 million) in bad loans to the
Hanbo Group in particular led to over 270 billion won (U.S. $225

million) in losses to the bank."' KFB management allegedly received bribes in return for these loans. In a historic decision, the
Seoul District Court not only found KFB directors responsible
for mismanagement and misconduct, but awarded a record forty

billion won (U.S. $33.3 million) judgment against four former
KFB directors on behalf of the shareholders2 8
2" See Judgment of Dec. 12, 1997, Seoul Chi-bang-bup-won [District
Court], Jae 22 Hap-ui-min-sa-bu [22nd Civil Division], 97 Kahap 32890; seealso
Chang-won Lee & Sung-soo Bang, So-aek-joo-joo moo-shi.han joo-chong-gyul-uineun moo-byo [Shareholders' Meeting Resolutions that Disregarded Minority
ShareholdersIs Void], CHOSUN ILBo, Dec. 13, 1997, at 27. Other recent examples of successful actions against shareholders' meetings include Judgment of
Feb. 2, 1999, Seoul Chi-bang-bup-won [District Court], Jae 14 Hap-ui-min-sabu [14th Civil Division], 98 Kahap 24407.
" See Lee & Bang, sqpra note 254. On appeal, however, the Seoul High
Court reversed the cancellation of the resolutions of the shareholders' meeting
primarily because of the overwhelming consequences to shareholders and the
Korean economy that would have resulted. See Judgment of Aug. 25, 1998,
Seoul Go-deung-bup-won [High Court], Jae 9 Min-sa-boo,98 Na 5267. The
High Court did emphasize that otherwise it would be proper to cancel the
resolutions of the meeting.
256 See Dae-yon Kim, Joo-joo-dae-pyo-so-song-gwa gyong-young-pan-dan.ui.
won-chik [Shareholder Derivative Actions and the Business Jutdgment Rule], 17
COM. L. REV. 111 (1999); see also Hong-yul Kim,oJae-il-eunhaengso-aek-joo0joo.

deul i-sajin-sang-dae son-shil-bo-jun chung.goo so-song [Minority Shareholde-s of
KFB Bring Suit Against Directors],CHOSUN ILBo, Apr. 11, 1997; Jin-woo Lee,
Gook-nae choi-cho jooJoo dae-pyo so-song.., cham-yuh.yon-dae, jae-il-eun-haeng
goo-gyong-young- in sang-dae [First ShareolderDerivative Suit in Korea... Peo.
pies Solidarity -or ParticipatoryDemocracy Against the Former Management of
KFB], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, June 3, 1997.
" PSPD was able to gather 894,702 shares to barely meet the new lowered
0.5% holding requirement of 820,000 shares under the SEA that became effective April 1, 1997. See Hong-yul Kim, supra note 256.
" See Judgment of July 24, 1998, Seoul Chi-bang-pop-won [District
Court], Jae 17 Min-sa-hap-ui-bu [17th Civil Division], 98 Kahap 39907; Byung-
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The compensatory award of the shareholder derivative action
and the cancellation of the shareholders' meeting had a powerful
impact on the burgeoning shareholder movement." 9 The cases
served to impress upon Korean management the importance of
their responsibilities and duties to their shareholders and the consequences they may face as a result of their decisions.
4.4.

MonitoringManagement Decisions: Samsung Electronics
and SK Telecom

Recent investor pressure against some of Korea's premier blue
chip companies has sent a powerful161message that all companies
must pay heed to their shareholders.
In March 1998, organized
shareholders attended the Samsung Electronics Corporation's annual shareholders' meeting and questioned its management about
a variety of business decisions at unprecedented levels. 6 Instead
moon Gong, Jun-jik-eun-haeng-jangdeung4 myung-ae 400 uhk won bae-sangpangyul [400 Billion Won Judgment Against Four Including FormerBank President],
L. TIMES (Seoul), July 27, 1998, at 2; Slater,supra note 30 (stating that "the decision sent shock waves through boardrooms").
'9 See Dae-yon Kim, supra note 256, at 111-12. Other notable examples of
shareholder lawsuits that were raised thereafter include an action brought by
minority shareholders against Korea Telecom and Samsung Electronics. See Insoon Kim, supra note 69; infra Section 4.4. Minority shareholders also recently
brought a 67 billion won (U.S. $55 million) shareholder derivative action
aganst the directors of the now defunct Daedong Bank. See Ui-ho Song, Twoechool.eun-haeng so-aek-joo-joo chut so-song [Minority Shareholder's First Lawsuit
Against Defunct Bank],JOONGANG ILBO, Oct. 30, 1998, at 31.
260 See Kan -eun Lee, So-aek-joo-joo-dae-pyo chut seung-so/ui-mi-wa gwa-jang
[First ShareholderDerivative Suit Victory/leaning and Impact], DONGA ILBO,
July 24, 1998, at 3.
261 See Hae-won Choi, supra note 209, at 13 (noting that "[i]nvestors are
watching a new indicator in South Korea: minority-s areholder activism");
Seong C. Gweon, Yes, There Is Hope, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 31, 1998 ([T]he
best thing to happen is that shareholders, nothing but owners, pay attention to
their own wealth and interests. What happened to both SK Telecom and Samsung Electronics must have sent a clear message to the 'owners' of companies
in this country.").
262 See Naniju Cho, Halting Pace of Korea Inc. Reforms Is Highlighted:-Samsung Electronics Meeting Indicates Sharehom Have Far to Go in Asserting Themselves, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at 4. The management of Samsung
Electronics was specifically questioned on its relation to Samsung's disastrous
venture into the automobile industry and its near billion dollar failed investment in the U.S. personal computer manufacturer AST. Shareholders also
challenged the propriety of Samsung Electronics' private issuance of convertible bonds to the son of the chairman of the Samsung Group at a tremendous
discount. See id.
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of a somnolent and scripted thirty-minute affair, the meeting
lasted for a record sixteen hours.263
Shareholders proceeded to exercise their various newfound
rights under the KCC. Shareholders first requested an inspection
of the contents of the board of directors' minutes.2" The management of Samsung Electronics initially did not comply with
this request, but changed its position when the Suwon District
Court issued a three million won fine against it.265 Shareholders
then commenced a shareholder derivative action against various
directors of Samsung Electronics on several counts. The action
included claims concerning bribes paid to two former presidents
and illegal trading with its subsidiaries.2 6 These various events
forced many to realize that even Korea's premier companies must
not disregard the interests of their shareholders and helped reorient companies to understanding that management must in fact respect the interests of their shareholders.267
In contrast, at about the same time in March 1998, the management of SK Telecom ("SKT") accepted a host of shareholder
demands before its annual shareholders' meeting.268 Such an acceptance was a milestone in Korean corporate history. This
agreement followed the first proxy solicitation initiated by a forSee id. In the 1999 annual shareholders' meeting, shareholders raised
additional issues. Attempts to negotiate a compromise failed, and Samsung
Electronics was able to obtain the necessary votes to amend its articles of in263

corporation to exclude cumulative voting. See Young-i Lee, So-aek-ju-ju 4-daegroupju-chong kyuk-dol [Minority Shareholdersof 4 Major Groups Clash at Sharehoder Meetings], DONGA ILBO, Mar. 21, 1999.
264 See KCC art. 396.
265 See Hyo-jae Lee, I-sa-hwoi-gi-rok yeol-lam-guh-bu, chae.bol-ae gwa.tae-ryo
bu-gwa [Rejection ofInspection ofBoardofDirectorsMinutes Leads to Fine Against
Chaebol], CHOSUN ILBO, June 13, 1998.
266 See Myung-jin Lee, [Cham-yuh-yon-dae] Sam-sung-jun-ja gyung-young-jinsang-daeson-hae-bae-sang[PSPDFiles a CompensatoryAction Against SEC's Management], CHOSUN ILBO, Oct. 20, 1998.
267 See Don Kirk, Shareholders Take on Big Seoul Firms, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 22, 1999, at 11 ("Shareholders' meetings, traditionally pro forma
affairs in which the executives of large companies faced no criticism, much less
opposition, took a different turn this year because of South Korea's economic
crisis.").
268 See Seong C. Gweon, supra note 241; Byung-soo Kim, So.aek-joo-joo-

woon.dong cham-yuh-yun-dae-SK hap-ui-ui ui-mi [Minority Shareholder Movement: Meaning of the PSPD-SK Agreement], HANGYORAE SHINMUN (Seoul),
Mar. 26, 1998; Jong-won Koh & Soon-hyun Hwang, Chae-bol-do 'too-myung
gyung-young" yak-so ba-da-nae [Obtaininga 'TransparentManagement' Promise
rom a Chaebol], CHOSUN 11B0, Mar. 27, 1998, at 9.
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eign shareholder.269 SKT's management not only agreed to elect
two outside directors and an independent auditor, but also agreed
to accept the candidates chosen by shareholders to act in these positions."
Next, several important amendments were made to the articles of incorporation. The new articles of incorporation provide
that interconglomerate trading within the SK Group between related or sister companies that are in excess of ten billion won
(U.S. $8.33 million) must be approved by a majority of the outside directors. As a result, outside directors were recently able to
reclaim 300 billion won (U.S. $216 million) that was subsidized in
the form of commercial paper to several sister companies. 1 SKT
also agreed to recover 300,000 shares that were improperly given
to a sister company. 2'
Overall, in 1998, outside directors
amended six out of twelve interconglomerate deals that they reviewed and rejected two deals altogether. ' These efforts by outside directors and auditors in particular were among the most
successful examples of internal supervision under the new corporate environment. ' 4
Despite this progress in 1998, management consistently rejected various proposals by shareholders in 1999. First, they
amended the company's articles of incorporation to exclude cu-

See Gwang-am Chun, 'Tiger' deung 4 gae woe-gook-gae fund SK Telecom
foo-joo-gwon' noon-dok [Four Foreign Funds Including Tiger Eye 'Shareholder
Rights' in SK Telecom], DONGA ILBO, Mar. 17, 1998, at 21.
27 See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Directors Get Tough with SK Telecom, ASIAN
WALL ST. J, Sept. 29, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Hilsenrath, Directors Get Tough];
Jon E. Hilsenrath, In Seoul. Tiger Won Telecom Fight but Locals May Win War,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at 19 [hereinafter Hilsenrath, Tiger Won].
Another significant point was that foreign investors for one of the first recorded times joined minority investors in officially making various demands
towards management. See Hong-gi Kim & Soon-hyung Hwang, Woe-gook-fund
joo-chong pyo-dae-gyul" sun-un [Foreign Funds Declare a "Shareholders'Meeting
Vote Chalege'],CHOSUN ILBO, Mar. 17, 1998, at 12.
271 See Hilsenrath, Directors Get Tough, supra note 270, at 1; Soon-hyun
Hwang, Sa-woe i-sa wui-ryuk gwa-shi' [Outside Directors 'Demonstrate' Their
Power], CHOSUN ILBO, Oct. 1, 1998, at 27.
272 See Hwang, supra note 271, at 27.
2 See Sa-woe i-sa: sung-gong sa-rae-SK Telecom [Outside Directors:A Successful Case- SK Telecom], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 16, 1999.
27 See id. (citing how, unlike other corporations, the outside directors held
over 80 discussion meetings and how outside directors were selected by minority shareholders).
269
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mulative voting. ' Furthermore, SKT's outside auditor became
the first auditor to call a shareholders' meeting under the newly
established Article 412-3. The auditor convened the meeting because of his objections to a controversial new stock issue." 6
Nevertheless, SKT's management was praised for its initial
willingness to accept a considerable degree of the proposals by its
shareholders at the time.' Some skeptics, of course, claim that
these changes were only possible because management could not
afford to ignore foreign investors, who held more than a thirtythree percent stake at the time."8 Yet, SKT announced it would
be willing to establish an audit committee for the company, one
of the first in Korea. 9 Overall, the managerial changes accomplished in the SKT case offer a glimpse into the future of corporate governance in Korea."'
This became possible because, in contrast to the government's overall
efforts to strengthen accountability and transparency through the adoption of
cumulative voting, the critical 18% stake of SKT held by Korea Telecom, a
public enterprise, voted with management to exclude cumulative voting. See
Sung-gun Cho, Jip-jung-too-pyo-jae-ui hyang-bang [The Future Direction of the
275

Cumulative Voting System], KOREA ECON. DAILY, Mar. 22, 1999.
276 See Ji-hun Lee, Chae-bol-chong-soo hae-im-an joo-chong-su chut-pyo.gyul
[First Vote at Shareholders' Meeting on Termination of a Chaebol Chairman],
CHOSUN ILBO, Aug. 28, 1999.
m See Hilsenrath & Cho, supra note 204, at 1 (noting that it is "likely to
be regarded as a landmark"). For comments on the limitations of the SKT case
and some of the negative aspects of its management, see Jon E. Hilsenrath,RethinkingAsia: The Search for Solutions, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998, at S4;
Craig Karmin & Jane L. Lee, Fund Managers Object to Planfor Korean Issue,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 17, 1999, at 1.
28 The limitation on foreign ownership of SKT which exists under a special law was raised to 49% as of July 1, 1999. See Electronic Communication
Business Law, Law No. 4394 of 1991 (amended Law No. 5385 of 1997), arts. 6,
7.

' See Soon-Hyun Hwang, SK Telecom gom-sa-hyub-ui-hwoe-ui-hwoe chulbum [SK Telecom EstablishesAudit Committee], CHOSUN ILBO, May 13, 1999.
280 One of the most significant signs of progress recently occurred when
Dacom, Korea's leading internet service provider and part of the LG conglomerate, accepted proposals of PSPD. Among other things, Dacom agreed both
to elect half of its eight directors as outside directors, and to establish an audit
committee with two-thirds of its members as outside directors. Both of these
measures occurred one year ahead of the SEA's requirements. PSPD has been
given the right to nominate two of the outside directors. Dacom has also
agreed to require that the audit committee approve interconglomerate trading
and special issues of stocks and bonds. See Business in South Korea: CareerPath,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2000, at 59-60; Ji-hoon Lee & Hee-chun Cho,So.aek.juju.
un-dong chut gyul-shil ...Dacom tu-myung-hwa-hab-ui [FirstFruitsfor Minority
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5. CONCLUSION: REORIENTATION OF CORPORATE KOREA

AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The recent revisions to the Commercial Code mark a significant transition in Korea's corporate regulatory environment. All
of these reforms should be consolidated by the following factors.
First, foreign investors will increasingly play a larger role in Korean corporations and the utilization of the KCC."' The ownership restrictions for foreign investors have been completely lifted

in almost all listed companies." 2 As of May 25, 1998, foreign investors are no longer restricted from hostile takeovers.283 Foreign
investors, in fact, already own twenty percent of the total volume
of listed stock on the Korea Stock Exchange, including majority
shares in several blue chip companies. 4
Representatives of foreign investors sit on the board of directors of such institutions as Korea Exchange Bank and SKT.85
While they still might be hesitant at present, companies realize
that foreign investors will not be as passive as Korean shareholders. Companies with large foreign ownership must particularly
pay attention.286 For instance, Samsung Electronics and SKT,
which both have substantial foreign ownership, have been paying

ShareholderMovement... Dacom Agrees to Become Transparent],CHOSUN
Mar. 7, 2000.

ILBO,

281 See Hong-ryul Chun, supra note 110, at 76-77; Charles Lee, Business In-

vestment: Open Sesame: South Korea Warms Toward Foreign Investors, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Dec. 24, 1998, at 51 (citing recent examples of foreign investment
such as Volvo's U.S. $720 million purchase of Samsung's constructionequipment division, BASF's U.S. $600 million purchase of Daesang's animalfeed-additive business and British Telecom's U.9. $373 million equity stake in
LG Telecom).
282 The foreign ownership restriction was lifted on May 25, 1998, excluding certain public companies. See Foreign Securities Trading Regulation, Financial Supervisory Service.
283 See Foreigner Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act, Law
No. 5538 of 1998 mended by Foreigner Investment Promotion Act, Law No.
Sept. 16, 1998).

284 See [Joo-*oo.chong-hwoe] Hot Issue... 5 dae group 5 gae gi-up si-kkeu-rop-da
[Hot Issues at Shareholders'Meetings... Noisy at the Five Largest Companies of the

Five Largest Groups], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1999.
285 See Sara Webb, Asian Companies Open Themselves Up to Foreigners,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at 22.
286 See generally Jane L. Lee & Hae Won Choi, Korean Firms Resist Change
at Key Meetings, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at 1 (noting that foreign
shareholders were more active in the current year's shareholders' meetings).
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heightened attention to the demands of foreign shareholders. 8
Overall, a significant but subtle disciplining effect on Korean corporate governance is emerging.288
In addition to foreign investors, Korean institutional inves-

tors, which now own almost thirty-five percent of the total listed

shares, are also on the brink of becoming more active actors.28 9

Until last year, institutional investors have been restricted in exercising their voting rights from customer accounts.29 At most,
they occasionally objected to mergers or merely claimed appraisal
rights.291 As witnessed in the annual shareholders' meetings that
were held in the spring of 1999, overall they still remained pas-

sive.292 Most institutional investors, for instance, generally ab-

stained or voted against the adoption of cumulative voting.293

Yet, with the explosion of closed-end funds and unit trust investment in 1999, and the consequent increase in competition among

institutional investors, this predisposition is likely to change.

See Bong-kwon Park, Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom, Korea Telecom
deungfjip-jung-too-pyo-jae bae-jae-ae woe-gook-in hyup-jo [Samsung Electronics, SK
Telecom, Korea Telecom Seek Cooperationof Foreigners in Excluding Cumulative
Voting], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Mar. 12, 1999.
288 See Hae-won Choi, supra note 209, at 13 (noting that "foreign investors
praise the changes pushed through by minority shareholders"); Sung-il Hong,
Woe-gook-in-ji-boon man-eun sang-Jang-sa-deuljoo-chong bi-sang [Listed Companies with Large Foreign Ownership on Alert for Their Shareholders' Meetings],
JOONGANG ILBO, Jan. 10, 1998, at 25; Moon Ihlwan,supra note 204, at 52;.
289 See KSE, Joo-shik [Stock], Apr. 1999; Jae-won Lee, supra note 27, at 164;
Hong-ryul Chun, supra note 110, at 77.
290 See Jae-won Lee, supra note 27, at 167-77.
291 See Gi-gwan gi-up-gyung-yong gam-shi na-sut-da [Institutional Investors
Begin Monitoring Corporate Management], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Feb. 27, 1997;
Yoon-jae Han, Gi-gwan-too-ja-ga ui-gyul-gwon juk-geuk haeng-sa-reul [Institutional Investors Should Actively Exercise Voting Rights], CHOSUN ILBO, June 30,
1999, at 6 (providing a list of some of the rare instances where institutional investors have raised their objections).
292 See Hun-soo Kim & Yong-hae Choijip-jung-too-pyo-Jaenon.lan... sang.
jang-sa bae-jae-chu-jin-ae gi-gwan-too-ja-ga Ju, ji na-suh [iispute Concerning Cu.
mulative Voting... InstitutionalInvestors Seek to Block Attempts by Listed Companies to Exclude Provision], MAEIL Bus. NEWS, Feb. 12, 1999. But cf. Jae-oh
Yoon, 12 wol gyul-san sang-Jang-sajoo-chong i-bun-joo-boo-tuh bon-gyuk gae-mak
[Listed Companies with Accounting Years Ending in December Commence Shareholders'Meetings This Week], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Feb. 21, 1999 (describing that
Daehan Investment Trust and Korea Investment Trust did object to a recent
merger between Hyundai Motors and Hyundai Motor Service).
293 See Hun-soo Kim & Yong-hae Choi,supra note 292.
28
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Furthermore, Korea is facing considerable peer pressure from
international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") to modify its
corporate regulations to reflect newly emerging international
standards.294 Korea accepted various aspects of the OECD proposals. Among the reforms adopted, outside directors must comprise one-quarter of the board of listed companies.29 Although
outside directors face limitations in all corporate systems, overall
they should be able to provide additional checks and balances to
the management structure dominated by the principal shareholders. Moreover, large companies and securities firms with assets of
over two trillion won face even stricter standards.296 First, they
must elect at least three outside directors to their boards in 2000
and more than half by 2001.
These outside directors also must
be elected through nominating committees. Second, they must
establish audit committees where more than two-thirds of their
members are outside directors.29 In light of the significant position of financial companies, the standard holding requirements to
exercise shareholders rights have been lowered by an additional
fifty percent in the case of shareholders of securities companies.299
The 1995, 1998, and 1999 revisions to the KCC represent the
third, fourth, and fifth amendments in a period of over thirty
years. Although various changes still need to be made, unimaginable progress has been achieved at an alarming pace. The onset of
the Korean financial crisis in late 1997 ironically served as a catalyst for further reforms. Korea attempted to tackle some of the
central problems of its corporate regulation such as the lack of acSee Yong-yool Kim, Woo-ri-na-ra-ui gi-up-ji-bae-goo-jo mo-bum-gyu-yak
jae-jung ui-ui-wa bang-hyang [The Meaning and FutureDirection of the Establishment ofBest Practices-forKorean CorporateGovernance],39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 9
(1999).
294

295 See SEA art. 191-16.
296

See id.; SEA arts. 54-5, 54-6.

297 See SEA art. 191-16, annex art. 8.

29' See SEA arts. 191-17, 54-6. See generally Bup-gae-jungjak-up so-gae [IntroducingPreparationsof Law Amendments], L. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 3; Bokki Hong, I-sa-hwoe-wa geu ui-won-hwoe: gam-sa-ui-won-hwoe-ui do-ip-yuh-boo-ae
dae-ban gum-to [Board of Directorsand Its Committees: Reviewing the Possibility
ofAdopting Audit Committees], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 51 (1999); Jong-ho Kwon,
ll-bon-ui gi-upji-bae-goo-jo dong-byang-gwa woo-ri-na-ra gam-sa-jae-do-ui gae-sun
[Recent Trends in Japanese Corporate Governance and Improving the Korean
Audit System], 39 SANG-JANG-HYUP 72 (1999).
299 See SEA art. 64.
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countability in corporate governance, weak directors and auditors, ineffective shareholder rights, and transparency standards.
External corporate governance has been promoted by facilitating
mergers and acquisitions.
Various reforms still need to be pursued. Class actions suits
are still not permitted. Although a proposed law to permit class
actions has been drafted, it has continued to linger in the National
Assembly.3" Despite the recent amendments, the current threshold shareownerhip requirements still act as a barrier to the exercise of shareholder rights and need to be lowered further.
Nevertheless, the recent amendments to Korea's Commercial
Code should increase the competitiveness of corporate Korea. Instead of operating in a vacuum, Korean corporations can only become more efficient institutions by finally facing at least some degree of monitoring controls and internal and external corporate
governance discipline. These changes can only serve to enhance
the international competitiveness of corporate Korea.

" See The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (visited Nov. 1,
1999) < http://www.assembly.go.kr >. The IMF initially requested the inclusion of class action suits. See Gyung-ho Yoon, So-soo-joo-joo fib-dan-so-song.jae
[Minority ShareholderClass Action], MAEIL BUS. NEWS, Dec. 24, 1997.
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